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According to standard conceptions of agency, our reasons and intentions guide our actions. That 
is, goal-directed intentions play a key role in practical deliberation, planning, and execution of 
action. Furthermore, purposeful, goal-directed behavior warrants attributions of responsibility or 
“reactive attitudes” like resentment, anger, gratitude and forgiveness. However, recent 
developments of the dual-process theory of mind cast doubt on the empirical adequacy of this 
picture. While people take themselves to be responding to relevant reasons, they are often 
bypassed by irrelevant affective or automatic reactions. In this work I go beyond the dual-
process theory of mind to offer a mechanistic account of the role of emotion in agency and 
practical deliberation. In particular, I show that emotion undermines our reflection by structuring 
our agential point of view, skewing our reactive attitudes, and preparing us for action at the 
expense of accurate self-awareness. I conclude by offering a way of developing agential skills 
without relying on accurate reflection. In particular, I show how increasing self-diversity can 
foster cognitive flexibility and the ability to form appropriate affective reactions.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
According to everyday conceptions of agency, our reasons and intentions make a real difference 
to how we act (e.g., Malle 2004). According to this conception, there is a close connection 
between intentional action and acting for a reason (Anscombe 1957; Davidson 1963). Dating 
back to Aristotle, the standard conception of agency suggests that reasons-based changes to the 
world could be rationalized from the agent’s point of view (i.e., by the agent’s beliefs and desires 
that could be cited as justifications for her actions). That is, goal-directed intentions play a key 
role in practical deliberation, planning, and execution of action (e.g., Mele 1992, Bratman 1987). 
How does an agent act from her point of view on the world? Many philosophers believe agency 
to be possible due to a single faculty of practical reason. For example, Aristotelians allot 
accurate reflection a key role in our ability to govern our lives in the development of virtue (e.g., 
Annas, 1993). Likewise, philosophers in the Kantian tradition celebrate the reflective agent as 
someone capable of self-direction (Wallace 2003; Velleman 1989). More recently, Frankfurt 
famously distinguished the reflective agent from a mere Wanton, who simply follows his 
unquestioned desires to action (Frankfurt, 1988). 
In particular, Frankfurt delineates distinctly human agency with the concept of reflective 
endorsement. i.e., reflection that allows one to form second-order desires about one’s first-order 
desires. In other words, what it means to endorse a desire is to reflect on the type of person one 
wants to be and form higher-order desires or volitions for a certain first-order desires to be 
effective (Frankfurt, 1988). 
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That is, unlike thoughtless automatons, humans engage in flexible, goal-directed behavior. 
Human behavior is flexible exactly because it is guided by accurate awareness of the relevant 
features of our psychology, as well as accurate awareness of the relevant features of the 
environment (e.g., Austin and Vancouver, 1996). For instance, a “person who does not know her 
motives is missing something she would need to deliberate well.” (Velleman 2000, p. 12).  
Conceptions of reflective agency permeate our everyday lives. For example, learning that 
someone accidentally stepped on your foot usually causes you to adjust your indignation. That is, 
purposeful, goal-directed behavior warrants attributions of responsibility or “reactive attitudes” 
like resentment, anger, gratitude and forgiveness (Strawson 1962; Vargas 2004, Watson 1993). 
In sum, according to popular conceptions of agency, we act for reasons and have the capacity to 
make reasons-based changes to the world. Along the same lines, we have the capacity to discern 
relevant features of the world and relevant features of our psychology in following our reasons to 
action.  
However, recent findings in neuroscience and cognitive science cast doubt on the empirical 
adequacy of this conception of agency. For example, recent challenges from dual-process 
theories of mind suggest that System 1 automatic affective reactions drive judgment and action, 
while System 2 reasoning merely offers post hoc rationalizations. In particular, dual-process 
theories of cognition suggest that two systems play a role in evaluation. While System 1 is 
unconscious, automatic, and affectively charged; System 2 is slow, conscious, and affectively 
neutral. Furthermore, System 2 cannot change concurrent automatic affective processes, but only 
offers post hoc rationalizations after the judgment has already been reached. 
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 As a result, causes and reasons for action are often incongruent (Doris, 2015; Greene, 2008; 
Haidt, 2001; Prinz, 2009). That is, while people take themselves to be responding to relevant 
reasons in their psychology and the environment, they are often bypassed by irrelevant affective 
or automatic reactions (Cameron et. al., 2013). This kind of ignorance is particularly troublesome 
for the standard conception of agency if the agent would in fact disavow her motives, were she 
made aware of them.  
Nevertheless, proponents of the standard conception of agency resist this skepticism on several 
grounds. First, mechanistic details behind the dual-process theory remain rather mysterious. 
Details about the role of emotion and automaticity remain highly disputed (e.g., Mugg, 2016). In 
particular, May argues that both affect and reasoning could be somewhat automatic and contain 
cognitive elements (May, 2020). Along the same lines, even if deliberation cannot always 
penetrate concurrent evaluation, perhaps there is a way for reasoning to offer a top-down 
influence on automatic processes through practice (e.g., Osman 2004; Keren and Schul, 2009).  
In this work I consult empirical findings to offer several new arguments for incongruence not 
subject to these limitations. In chapter 2, I offer a detailed account on the role of consciousness 
in deliberation. In chapter 3, I outline the role of affect in our agential point of view on the world. 
In chapter 4, I outline the role of affect in attributing propositional attitudes like beliefs and 
desires towards oneself and others. In chapter 5, I argue against the view that emotions serve as 
epistemically significant representations of the world that could inform deliberation. I conclude 
by offering a way to develop agential skills without relying on accurate reflection. Let’s take a 
look at this outline in more detail.  
In chapter 2, I argue that not all feelings represent changes in the world. Specifically, 
phenomenology of mental effort or the feeling of working hard mentally is not a matter of 
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tracking features in a certain way. As a result, it does not appear that all phenomenal states 
represent features of the world.  
This argument does not bode well for standard conceptions of agency. In particular, feelings of 
working hard mentally are commonly taken as indicators of intentional deliberation. Since 
mental effort comes and goes without our say, we do not always know whether we are 
performing mental tasks intentionally. Hence, our sense of agency in deliberating intentionally is 
under threat. 
However, perhaps the claim that we do not know whether we’re exerting conscious control can 
be reconciled with our commonsense conception of agency. That is, perhaps it is possible that 
the relevant mental attitudes could still play the right role in the exercise of agency, even if they 
are not consciousness accessed and marked by the phenomenology of mental effort (e.g., 
Pacherie 2008). In other words, it is possible that we can act for reasons without real-time 
conscious control and explicit deliberation. Nevertheless, the commonsense picture of the 
reflective agent deliberating hard in foraging self-direction is somewhat misguided.   
In chapter 3, I offer a mechanistic account of the role of emotion in our point of view on the 
world. I argue that emotion plays a key role in ensuring a unified perspective on the world. In 
particular, emotion creates and sustains a center/periphery structure in our conscious perspective 
on the world by signaling orders of perceived importance as well as orders of perceived 
changeability (i.e., felt actionability). 
This argument does not bode well for the standard conception of agency. In particular, the 
standard conception assumes that perception has a special epistemic significance in putting us in 
touch with the world. However, if not all consciousness is perceptual, not all consciousness 
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works to put us in touch with the world. Hence, not all consciousness serves as a defeasible 
source of justification. In short, if consciousness motivates action but still does not serve as a 
defeasible source of justification, our capacity to act for reasons is under threat. 
Furthermore, standard conceptions of agency assume that in order to make intentional, reasons-
based changes to the world, we need to feel like our reasons for action are actionable. However, 
since affect determines which options we feel to be actionable, reasons could be epiphenomenal 
in effecting change in the world. Hence, our capacity for making reason-based changes to the 
world is under threat.   
Nevertheless, these arguments still do not preclude the possibility of top-down influence on 
lower-level processes to create additional points of view on the world. In other words, even if 
certain reasons-based actions feel impossible, perhaps the agent could engage in emotion 
regulation to animate his reasons for action.  
In Chapter 4, I argue that the affective nature of intersubjectivity creates a burden for emotion 
regulation. In turn, the capacity for attributing propositional attitudes to ourselves and others 
evolved to help us navigate this affective burden. However, while attributing propositional 
attitudes in navigating the social hierarchy provides temporary relief against intersubjective 
immersion, it spells trouble for the epistemic significance of propositional attitudes. 
This argument does not bode well for the standard conception of agency. In particular, 
proponents of the standard conception of agency believe that making reasons-based changes to 
the world requires the ability to attribute appropriate propositional attitudes to oneself (ascribing 
the right beliefs, desires, and intentions). If attributing propositional attitudes to oneself is 
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skewed by the need to navigate the perceived social hierarchy as well as the need for emotion 
regulation, our ability to make reasons-based changes to the world is under threat.   
Similarly, the standard conception of agency requires the ability to form appropriate reactive 
attitudes towards oneself and others. Forming reactive attitudes requires the ability to attribute 
appropriate propositional attitudes towards oneself and others. However, if forming reactive 
attitudes is systematically skewed by irrelevant causes like perceived social rank and the need for 
emotion regulation, our status as moral agents is under threat.   
In this chapter, the reply from top-down control of higher-order processes loses a bit of traction.  
Since the very formation of higher-order attitudes is itself skewed by irrelevant causes like the 
need to navigate perceived social ranking and the need for emotion regulation, our capacity to 
exert top-down control is under threat.  
In Chapter 5, I argue against the view that emotions serve as epistemically significant 
representations of the world that could inform moral deliberation. In particular, I argue that 
emotions function to prepare us for action by activating other instrumental emotions. Since we 
cannot distinguish between “genuine” and instrumental emotions, and instrumental emotions 
remain resistant to reappraisal, the agential role of emotions undermines their epistemic 
significance. As a result, emotions’ ability to inform moral judgment is under threat. 
This argument does not bode well for the standard conception of agency. In particular, some 
philosophers resist the skepticism from the dual-process theory of mind by arguing that 
emotions, as well as reasons, could serve as epistemically significant representations of the world 
(e.g., May, 2020). However, if emotions’ agential component undermines their epistemic 
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significance, emotions indeed compromise our ability to makes reasons-based changes to the 
world. 
As in chapter 4, the reply from top-down control loses a bit of traction. In particular, since the 
distinction between “genuine” mental states and instrumental mental states is not available to 
introspection, one cannot tell whether there is any need for top-down control. As a result, the 
ability to exert top-down control in deliberation is under threat. 
I conclude by offering a way to cultivate agential skills without relying on accurate deliberation. 
In particular, I propose a way to increase cognitive flexibility by limiting the emotion regulation 
workload of instrumental emotions. I show that we can learn to limit the emotion regulation 
workload of a given set of instrumental emotions by cultivating a diverse set of values. For 
example, if ingroup pride is the only thing getting you through the day, it could be beneficial to 
form a number of other commitments to offer support while re-examining ingroup pride.  
Importantly, the capacity for cognitive flexibility is distinct from the capacity for accurate 
deliberation. Since emotions prepare us for action by triggering instrumental emotions, even 
accurate beliefs and emotions could foster cognitive rigidity by playing instrumental roles. 
Hence, even accurate emotions and beliefs could fail to be appropriate is they compromise 
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Chapter 2: Tracking Intentionalism and the 
Phenomenology of Mental Effort 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Most of us are familiar with the phenomenology of mental effort accompanying cognitively 
demanding tasks, like focusing on the next chess move or performing lengthy mental arithmetic. 
In this paper, I argue that phenomenology of mental effort poses a novel counterexample to 
tracking intentionalism, the view that phenomenal consciousness is a matter of tracking features 
of one’s environment in a certain way. 
Intentionalists argue that, necessarily, any two mental states that differ in their phenomenal 
properties will differ in their representational properties.1A common way of arguing against 
intentionalism is to present experience pairs that differ in phenomenal character but fail to differ 
in representational content. In similar fashion, I argue that an increase in the phenomenology of 
mental effort (henceforth PME) does not accompany a change in any of the following candidate 
representational contents: a) representation of externally presented features, e.g. brightness, 
contrast, and so on b) representation of task difficulty, c) representation of the possibility of 
error, d) representation of trying to achieve some state of affairs, e) representation of bodily 
changes like muscle tension, or f) representation of change in cognitive resource availability and 
lost opportunity cost. 
 
1 Supervenience relation characteristic of weak intentionalism is a natural starting point because (i) any stronger 
relationship between the two will entail the supervenience relation (e.g., if these two types of properties turn out to 
be identical, this will entail that the phenomenal at least supervene on the representational), and (ii) any hopes of 
giving a naturalistic account of phenomenal properties requires delineating which facts about mental state form the 
minimal supervenience base 
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I focus on what is commonly taken to be the most promising reductionist intentionalist theory of 
phenomenal consciousness, i.e., weak global intentionalism conjoined with a tracking theory of 
intentionality, broadly defended by David Armstrong, Fred Dretske, Christopher Hill, William 
Lycan, and Michael Tye.2 By offering a way to reduce all consciousness to tracking, tracking 
intentionalism offers a promising physicalist theory of consciousness.3 Since many believe that 
this view offers the best chance of naturalizing consciousness, these arguments deserve detailed 
consideration (Pautz, 2013; Cutter and Tye, 2011).  
2.1.1 What is Intentionalism? 
Intentionalism posits a close relationship between phenomenal and representational properties. 
Phenomenal properties of mental states concern what it is like for a subject to experience certain 
phenomenal properties. For example, when I look at the gray cat on my desk, my visual 
experience has a distinctive phenomenal character. In virtue of what does my visual experience 
of the gray cat has its distinctive phenomenal character?  
 According to intentionalism, my experience of the gray cat has its distinctive phenomenal 
character in virtue of the way it represents the world as being (Cutter and Tye, 2011). Roughly, 
this reductionist program operates in the following way: all phenomenal consciousness is spelled 
 
2 The supervenience claim could take one of various forms: (a) local vs. global; and (b) intramodal vs intermodal. 
The first distinction concerns whether supervenience only holds for a certain class of mental states or for all mental 
states, e.g., whether it holds only for visual perceptual states or for all states including moods. The second distinction 
concerns whether supervenience holds only for pairs of states of the same sense modality, or for any random pair of 
states across modalities. Notably, as Speaks (2015) points out, these distinctions are a matter of degree. Since the 
modality of this phenomenology doesn’t allow straightforward delineation, the intramodal/intermodal distinction 
won’t provide any traction. For the same reason, since we are exploring a new type of phenomenology previously 
untouched in the debate, we are concerned with global rather than local intentionalism given that only global 
intentionalists promise to find a supervenience base for any pair of phenomenal experiences whatsoever. 
3 First, TI reduces phenomenal states to intentional states, which in turn are explained in terms of the tracking 
relation of broadly physical properties and states if affairs. The reduction of intentionality to tracking enjoys recent 
popularity (Bourget and Mendelovici, 2013). 
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out in intentionalist terms, while intentionality is spelled out in tracking terms (Bourget and 
Mendelovici, 2013). For example, tokens of a state S in an individual x represent that p in virtue 
of the fact that: under optimal conditions, x tokens S if p, and because p (Cutter and Tye, 2011).   
2.1.2 Past Alleged Counterexamples to Intentionalism 
The main counterexample strategy for intentionalism is to refute the supervenience claim, i.e. to 
find a change in phenomenal properties of a subject’s experience that is not accompanied by a 
change in the way the world is represented. A common pattern in intentionalist replies is to find 
some, however small, difference in the way the world is represented along with the phenomenal 
change in question. After seeing how the intentionalist handles past alleged counterexamples to 
intentionalism, we will be in a good position to consider whether a change in PME is also 
vulnerable to the same style of refutation, i.e., whether a change in PME is in fact necessarily 
accompanied by a change in the way putatively external objects are represented.   
Consider the putative counterexample of blurred vision. If you take off your glasses or simply 
stop focusing your eyes, you will experience certain blurriness in your visual field. In other 
words, you will see objects in a blurry way without seeing them as blurry. According to 
Boghossian and Velleman (1989), what the experience represents may well be the same before 
and after taking off the glasses, but the phenomenology is different.   
The intentionalist response to this example is a familiar one: there is a change in the way features 
of the external objects are presented. With blurry vision, the edges of objects have indistinct 
contours. There is less information about the putative location of the edges in the blurry 
condition than in the focused condition. Thus, there is indeed a representational difference as 
well as a phenomenal difference between the two conditions (Tye, 2006). 
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This response exploits the gestalt function of attentional mechanisms (i.e., allowing the 
appearance of certain features to become brighter at the expense of the brightness of other 
features, or gaining more information about some features at the expense of information about 
others).4 For example, as you focus on the computer monitor in front of you, you inevitably 
“zoom out” of your surroundings. 
However, empirical findings suggest that the gestalt function of attention is not a necessary 
feature of attention. Another function of attentional mechanisms rarely discussed in the 
philosophical literature is to handle interference in processing (henceforth interference). As we 
will see in the following section, the subject does not notice the phenomenal change associated 
with this type of attentional control via tracking the way features are presented.  
This is exactly what we need for a counterexample to go through. We need introspection to 
reveal a phenomenal difference between two mental states without an accompanying difference 
in the way the world is represented. In the next section, I propose to take a closer look at the 
interference suppressing role of attentional control mechanisms previously untouched by the 
philosophical literature. What will emerge is the following dissociation: the interference 
suppressing role of attention both (i) results in the phenomenology of mental effort, and yet (ii) 
does not change the way putatively external features are presented. 
2.1.3 Why PME Poses a Problem for the Intentionalist 
Cognitive neuroscience has long been interested in the way the brain handles challenging and 
non-routine situations. These cognitively taxing situations have been most studied in association 
 
4 Evidence for the gestalt function of attention could be found in studies showing that attention enhances the 
perception of low-level visual features including contrast (e.g., Carrasco, Ling, & Read, 2004). 
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with one of three contexts: (1) tasks that require the overriding of prepotent responses (2) tasks 
that require selection among a set of equally permissible or under-determined responses, or (3) 
tasks that involve the commission of errors. A conflict in attentional mechanisms can occur when 
an automatic response needs to be inhibited, or no automatic response is available (e.g. working 
memory tasks like problem-solving) (Botvinick et al., 2004). 
Importantly, it has been shown that these types of mental processes are typically associated with 
a subjective feeling of mental effort (Naccache et al., 2005; Dehaene, Kerszberg et al., 1998). 
The main working paradigm for studying mental effort is to treat it as a result of interference in 
information processing. Certain processes interfere with one another for a variety of reasons. 
Some of these reasons are determined by the organization of our cognitive architecture. For 
example, the extent to which certain processes become automatized and are subsequently hard to 
override is determined by our cognitive organization.5 Other reasons involve the organization of 
our neural architecture.  
Van Veen et al. (2001) characterize the plurality of interference types in the following way:  
In cognitive psychology, information processing is often thought of as occurring at a 
number of different levels, which might correspond to the different phases of task 
processing, for example (i) stimulus encoding, (ii) target detection, (iii) response 
selection, and (iv) response execution. Theoretically, conflicts might occur at any or all of 
these levels (Van Veen et al., 2001, p.1302).  
While (i), (ii), and (iv) might affect the way putatively external features are presented, (iii) does 
not (Milham et al., 2001). To make this more concrete, let’s consider an example of PME where 
the gestalt features of attention are precluded by the conditions of the experiment. 
 
5 Botvinick et al. (2004), Cohen et al., (1990).   
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Saenz et al. (2003) explored the nature of information-processing interference while using the 
conflicting features of direction and speed.  
Consider the description of the relevant condition in the experiment:  
Observers were instructed to divide attention equally across two 
stimuli placed to the left and right of a central fixation point. In the 
first experiment, each stimulus was a circular patch consisting of 
two transparently overlapping fields of upward and downward 
moving dots. Subjects concurrently performed a speed 
discrimination task on one field of dots from each side, either 
moving in the same direction (up or down on both sides) or in 
different directions (up on one side and down on the other). Thus, 
without changing the visual display or the spatial distribution of 
attention, subjects divided attention across stimuli composed of 
either a common feature or opposing features. 
 
As you might have guessed, subjects experienced greater PME when they had to divide attention 
across different directions of moving dots than when they had to divide attention across the same 
direction of moving dots. Processing the speed of the targets feels more effortful when they 
move in different directions because speed and direction are processed by the same population of 
neurons (Maunsell and Newsome, 1987). To eliminate confounding variables, the authors made 
sure that no change in the way features are presented occurs:  
We used overlapping stimuli that were identical in all conditions so 
that differences in task performance could not be confounded with 
changes in the stimulus itself or with changes in the spatial 
distribution of attention (ibid, p.633) 
 
Interestingly, what is considered easy in the ‘easy’ condition is that subjects have to track either 
only the upward moving dots or only the downward moving dots on either sphere. In order to do 
that, the subjects inevitably “zoom out” of the dots moving in the direction that is not relevant to 
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the task at hand. Hence, they can simply learn to not see task irrelevant features. However, in the 
“difficult” condition, this “gestalt” switching does not take place since subjects have to track 
both the upward moving dots on the right side, and the downward moving dots on the left side. 
Since subjects are primed by each feature on the opposing side, “zooming out” is not possible. 
Subjects can’t simply learn to ignore a certain feature (either upward motion or downward 
motion), since it is exactly what they are supposed to be tracking on the other side.  
Importantly for our purposes, the phenomenological effect of interference is felt prior to a 
decrease in discriminatory performance. Hence, a change in phenomenology proceeds 
independently of a change in the way features are presented (Morsella et al., 2009, Milham et al., 
2001; Van Veen et al., 2001).6  
Saenz et al.’s findings provide some reason to doubt the necessity of the supervenience claim. A 
change in PME is not tracked via a change in the presentation of external features. Now that we 
have a handle of the type of phenomenology at stake, I will attempt to further the intentionalist 
account by offering ways of spelling out PME in intentionalist terms. If these accounts come up 
short, intentionalists face an uphill battle for finding a supervenience base for PME.  
  
 
6  Although the subjective ratings of mental effort were not the focus of the study, the validity of their measuring 
techniques has precedent in the empirical literature (Morsella et al., 2009). Specifically, to further explore the 
subjective dimension of cognitive effort, the Morsella et al. introduced the following paradigm for measuring 
subjective effects of interference. Subjects were trained to introspect the particular feeling associated with 
incongruent conditions of the Stroop task. This introspection training was done to ensure that “participants were 
introspecting the same thing during both flanker and Stroop tasks” (ibid, p.10). The experimenters found more 
subjective effects for incongruent conditions than for congruent conditions. Furthermore, these changes in 
phenomenology were reported prior to changes in response time. Interestingly, the phenomenology itself proved 




  15 
2.2 Obvious Intentionalist Replies 
Before presenting more lengthy replies, I will present a few possible replies that could be 
handled with relative ease. First, one might wonder if the relevant PME change in the difficult 
condition supervenes on a change in judgment. A change in judgment would surely qualify as a 
change in the way the subject is representing the world. For example, as the subject finds herself 
experiencing more mental effort, she could go from judging that “this task is hard on level 1” to 
“this task is hard on level 2.”.  
Several replies are available. First, numerous experiments have shown that evaluation of task 
difficulty is dissociable from the experience of mental effort in both clinical and normal 
populations. If PME evolved to track task difficulty in the same way pain evolved to track 
potential or actual bodily damage, an absence of PME during cognitively demanding tasks 
should spell some type of malfunction. Consider the following characterization of TI: tokens of a 
state S (PME) in an individual x represent that p (task is difficult) in virtue of the fact that: under 
optimal conditions, x tokens S (PME) iff p (task is difficult), and because p. Hence, if subjects 
are tokening PME without representing the task to be difficult, or if subjects are not tokening 
PME if they’re representing the task to be difficult, there must be a malfunction in the attentional 
mechanisms. Indeed, it is easy to see how subjects unable to feel pain are at an evolutionary 
disadvantage (Tye, 1995). Does an absence of PME during cognitively demanding tasks spell 
malfunction of the attentional mechanisms?  
Naccache et al. (2005) show that a subject’s attentional and cognitive abilities could be 
functioning normally despite (i) awareness of task difficulty level, as well as (ii), an absence of 
PME. The experimenters record the subject saying, “Yes, I can see how this task is a tricky one,” 
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but the subject still reports no feeling of PME.7 Furthermore, optimal cognitive performance in 
normal subjects characterized by “flow states” involve awareness of task difficulty in the 
absence of PME (Nakumura and Csikszentmihalyi, 2014).8  
Second, it appears that experiencing the task as hard is simply re-describing the phenomenology 
in question. Yes, you feel more effort, and this allows you to say that the task is hard, and then 
even harder, but this seems nothing more than introspecting on your phenomenology and finding 
words for it, i.e., “this feels a certain way, so it must be because the task is hard.” However, if the 
intentionalist wants to provide a non-circular basis for a representational difference, it can’t be a 
mere re-description of the phenomenology in question. Otherwise, there is a built-in response to 
any phenomenology presented as a counterexample. As Speaks (2015) points out, this built-in 
response risks trivializing intentionalism. Noticing a change in your phenomenology should not 
be the basis for delineating a representational change - it should be the other way around.  
Relatedly, one might notice the amount of time it’s taking to complete the task and thereby infer 
that it must be a difficult one. However, this appraisal could have nothing to do with the presence 
of PME. Nonchallenging, boring tasks tend to feel as if they’re stretching on for a long time 
while both (i) not triggering PME, and (ii) leading you to infer that they might have been 
difficult.    
 
7  Naccache et al. write that “Unexpectedly, control abilities of patient RMB evaluated in various versions of this 
Stroop tasks were amazingly preserved… we could see the presence of an efficient dynamic regulation of control 
abilities as indexed by Gratton and proportion effects” (ibid, p.1319).  
8 Mental flow states are characterized by the experience of mastery or feeling “in the zone”. For example, if playing 
a musical instrument and sight reading, the subject might be aware of how smoothly the experience is going. There 
might be associated feelings of control, i.e. being able to adjust to other players at short notice. In contrast, 
phenomenology of mental effort surfaces when one is aware that things are being presented smoothly, and yet there 
is an added awareness that it is costing some effort (even if you’re not quite sure how to “apply” it). 
(Csikszentmihályi et. al, 2005). Thus, it is the complete opposite of the experience of transparency.   
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Another straightforward reply on the behalf of the intentionalist is that an increase in PME is 
accompanied by a change in judgement about the possibility of erring. Since PME is often felt 
during task performance, task parameters easily delineate possibilities of erring.  This judgement 
change could be characterized in the following way: “Whoa! I was even closer to messing up this 
time, but fortunately, I skated by!”  
Nonetheless, it appears that the phenomenology of judging the possibility of erring is distinct 
from the phenomenology of mental effort. Consider the following scenario: you are asked to 
predict whether a coin will land heads or tails. Having made three successful predictions so far, 
you are asked to call it once again. You experience an even greater feeling of the possibility of 
erring. Even if you are just as likely to get it wrong as you are to get it right, you feel that this 
time around your luck has run out and you’re sure to get it wrong. However, even if you feel that 
you’re very close to erring, this phenomenology seems distinct from the phenomenology of 
mental effort normally experienced during solving a difficult math problem. This resultant 
phenomenology will be something like excitement or dread, but not mental effort. Hence, it is 
unlikely that an increase in the phenomenology of mental effort is tracking the possibility of 
erring.  
A related proposal with some intuitive appeal is that the phenomenology of mental effort tracks 
trying to achieve a yet unrealized outcome or state of affairs.9 In exploring this proposal, a few 
points are worth making. First, empirical findings suggest a double dissociation between goal 
pursuit and PME. Goal pursuit often happens outside consciousness (Custers and Aarts, 2010; 
 
9 I thank an anonymous referee for this suggestion.  
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Zedelius et. al., 2012). This pursuit might trigger mental effort in the absence of goal 
representation.  
On the other hand, conscious goal pursuit could happen in the absence of PME. For example, 
subjects experiencing mental flow are aware of pursuing and completing various goals but 
experience no accompanying PME (e.g. Csikszentmihályi et. al., 2005). 
One way for the intentionalist to make sense of this data is to suggest that despite these cases, in 
the paradigm case, when a subject experiences mental effort, she represents herself as trying to 
achieve some goal. However, it seems that the phenomenology associated with representing 
oneself as trying to achieve some goal is distinct from the phenomenology of mental effort.  
Going back to our previous example, I could represent myself as trying to predict whether the 
coin will land heads or tails. However, my trying is merely due to the uncertainty of the outcome 
and not the effort in bringing it about. Perhaps the intentionalist proposal could be refined to 
delineate the representational base of PME as “trying to achieve something difficult.” However, 
the same type of reply is available. It seems that trying to predict whether the die will land on a 
certain number is difficult, but it does not involve any phenomenology of mental effort.  
One might point out that what distinguishes these cases from instances of PME is the following: 
while you are a passive observer to the coin tosses, you’re an active participant in exerting 
mental effort. That is, one might suggest that you’re actively doing something to control the 
outcome when you’re experiencing PME. Hence, PME is akin to the phenomenology of agency.  
However, I would like to distinguish the phenomenology of mental effort from the 
phenomenology of agency. While the latter involves a feeling of control, the former does not.  
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Consider the following example of agentive phenomenology. As you apply more effort to 
pedaling, you’re simultaneously aware of the effect this effort has on your muscles and the pace 
of the bike. Tracking the correspondence between effort and represented changes allows a 
feeling of control.10 
On the other hand, no such correspondence exists between mental effort and the representation 
of worldly changes. Attempting to increase mental effort does not result in a reliable clarity 
increase. For example, a chess player could experience increasing levels of PME, but see no 
increase in the clarity of the problem. Try as we might, it is not always the case that we can 
simply “concentrate harder” when attempting a difficult mental problem. Unlike squinting, we 
can’t simply “flex our mental muscles” in order to “see” the solution a little bit clearer.  
Furthermore, even if no apparent change in the world is tracked, feelings of control in the 
phenomenology of agency still involve tracking some reliable effect our agential acts have on the 
represented state of the agent herself. Consider the following example: say you are trying to 
move an enormous boulder while noticing no accompanying change in the world (your efforts 
are futile since the boulder is too heavy). Even though no apparent changes in the world are 
tracked, you still experience a reliable correspondence between trying itself and some state of 
affairs. For example, you’re aware that the harder you push the boulder, the greater the muscle 
burn, and so on. Furthermore, in experiencing agential phenomenology, you feel a sense of 
control in increasing your levels of effort appropriate to the task.   
 
10 Christensen et al. (2015) illustrate the nature of agentive phenomenology in professional mountain biking. They 
argue that complex action involves a complex parametric structure (p. 344). For example, the agent is (somewhat) 
aware that applying pressure to the bike brakes influences the “control parameter” to change the speed (“target 
parameter”), which in turn could influence another parameter (e.g. curvature around the turn). So, a skilled agent can 
navigate the upcoming sharp curve via manipulating the amount of pressure she applies in order to manipulate the 
speed needed to make the turn. 
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In contrast, in trying to solve a difficult math problem, you are unable to control “flexing your 
mental muscles” in increasing degrees. You have no feeling of control in trying to exert mental 
effort (level 1), and then mental effort (level 2). You might have no idea how you went from 
level 1 to level 2 and back to 1 again! That is, you might slip in and out of flow states without 
being aware of actively trying to change your levels of effort (e.g. Csikszentmihályi et. al., 
2005).  
In sum, it appears that the phenomenology of agency is distinct from the phenomenology of 
mental effort. While the former involves a feeling of control, the latter does not. Hence, it does 
not seem that PME tracks trying to achieve some state of affairs. Now that we’ve gotten some 
shorter replies out of the way, let’s move on to considering more lengthy replies on the behalf on 
the intentionalist.  
2.2.1 Is PME Another Type of Bodily Phenomenology? 
Some tracking intentionalists might want to argue that the phenomenology of mental effort is just 
another type of bodily phenomenology, and thus could be handled in the same way. Some 
familiar examples of bodily phenomenology include the phenomenology of certain localized 
pains, muscle aches, and so on. For example, if you suddenly spill hot coffee on your leg, you 
experience a burning sensation on the skin surface of your leg. According to TI, your attention 
goes to the location of the bodily disturbance. That is, your pain appears to be on or in your body 
at location X.  
Now, we could plausibly ask: “Could PME represent that there is a bodily sensation of type d at 
location l”? Embodiment arguments are frequently used for theories of emotion.11 Prinz (2005) 
 
11 Prinz 2005, Damasio 1994b, and Tye 2008. 
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argues that bodily changes associated with emotions can, in fact, induce the feelings of emotions 
and thus could be taken to be sufficient for emotional experience (Ledoux, 1996). Could a similar 
line of argument be used for PME?  
Let’s take a closer look at the empirical backbone of the embodiment hypothesis. One common 
feature associated with mental hard work is bodily tension. While working on a difficult math 
problem, some might notice a familiar tension in their neck. Bodily muscle tension could thus 
serve as a supervenience base for the PME, i.e., changes in PME require changes in the 
representation of patterned bodily muscle tension.  
Unfortunately, this candidate does not hold up to empirical scrutiny. Studies have shown that 
patients paralyzed below the neck still experience mental effort while engaging in effortful motor 
imagery like mental rotation of three-dimensional objects (Alkadhi et al., 2005). Similarly, 
Cramer et al. (2005) show that subjects experience PME during mental imagery despite having 
lost all feeling below the neck.  
Perhaps the embodiment hypothesis could be refined to survive these findings. Even if bodily 
muscle tension does not play a key role in PME, a feeling of tightening in the facial musculature 
could serve as a supervenience base for PME. After all, knitted brows are a familiar sight in 
academic settings. The facial feedback hypothesis has enjoyed some standing in the empirical 
literature on emotion. Several studies have shown that when subjects are induced to make a 
certain emotion-specific facial expression (grimacing, frowning, etc.), they report experiencing 
the corresponding emotion (disgust, anger, and so on).12  
 
12 Duclos and Laird 2001; Duclosetal, 1989; Edelman 1984; Flack et al.1999; Kellerman and Laird 1982; for 
extensive review, see Laird and Bresler 1992; see also Niedenthal 2007; Niedenthal and Maringer, 2009). 
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Unfortunately, the facial feedback hypothesis has run into serious replication problems. The 
facial feedback hypothesis states that affective responses can be influenced by facial expressions, 
(e.g., smiling), even in the absence of emotional experiences. Specifically, Strack et al. (1988) 
had participants rate the funniness of cartoons while holding a pen in their mouths, thus inducing 
a “smile”. Surprisingly, ‘smiling’ subjects rated the cartoons as significantly funnier than when 
they held the pen with their lips (inducing a ‘pout’). However, this seminal study of the facial 
feedback hypothesis has not been replicated. In fact, the results of 17 independent direct 
replications of Study 1 from Strack et al. (1988), have failed to replicate (Wagenmakers et al., 
2016).  
Further trouble for the facial feedback hypothesis stems from case studies of subjects with facial 
paralysis. For example, Keillor et al. (2002) showed that a patient (F.P.) suffering from bilateral 
facial paralysis could still report normal emotional experiences despite her inability to convey 
emotions through facial expressions.  
While the generalizability of results drawn from a few case studies pulls little weight, inference 
to the best explanation leans against the facial feedback hypothesis for PME. That is, our 
intuitions in the thought experiments, the replication troubles of the facial feedback hypothesis, 
as well as outcomes of individual case studies of facially paralyzed patients all suggest that the 
embodiment thesis is an unlikely option for the intentionalist. 
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So far, I have argued that PME does not seem to be directed at any externally presented property. 
Perhaps tracking intentionalists could argue that PME represents a fact about the organism, e.g. 
cognitive or neural resource availability in relation to lost opportunity cost (Kurzban et al., 2013; 
Westbrook, 2015). 
A clarificatory note is in order. So far we have honored tracking intentionalists’ commitment to 
phenomenal externalism. According to phenomeal externalism, phenomenal properties are not in 
the mind but are out there in the world, (or on the subject who is in the world). This section will 
branch out to a more recent development of phenomenal externalism in the tracking 
intentionalist literature. That is, phenomenology doesn’t only track seemingly external object 
features like bodily damage and brightness, but also tracks general states of affairs. 
TI’s ability to account for tracking states of affairs has enjoyed some recent success (e.g., Hill, 
2009). Cutter and Tye (2011) argue that pain phenomenology, i.e., the experienced badness of 
pain, not only tracks bodily damage but also its threat to the organism’s well-being: 
Our pain experiences do not just represent the presence of tissue damage, but also (roughly) 
represent our tissue damage as being bad for us to some degree. This view, we argue, is 
independently motivated by the phenomenology of pain experience, and we show how it 
is consistent with, and indeed predicted by, the tracking theory of intentionality (ibid, p. 
91).  
 
Analogously, intentionalists could argue that in representing cognitive resource depletion, PME 
tracks a state that is “bad for us to a certain degree.” In this case, an increase in PME tracks the 
opportunity cost associated with continued resource expenditure. 
Consider the following fodder for this hypothesis. Kurzban et al., (2013) argue that 
phenomenology of effort is associated with a cost/benefit computation. They theorize that given 
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resource limitation; executive resource allocation should come with phenomenological tagging. 
If any resource is limited, its allocation carries an opportunity cost, i.e. the more resources are 
deployed in a particular task, the less resources could be deployed elsewhere. Hence, increased 
resource allocation should come with greater phenomenological reminder that perhaps these 
resources should be either (i) conserved, or (ii) redeployed elsewhere. Analogously, if physical 
energy expenditure and the related opportunity cost came with phenomenological tagging, it 
might increase one’s chances of survival. If one could feel that his current task is using up the 
last of his energy resources, he would have a strategic advantage, e.g., entering confrontation 
with an inaccurate estimate of energy availability could prove deadly.   
Perhaps intentionalists could extend this line of reasoning to PME. If mental resources are finite, 
their use should be phenomenologically marked in service of formulating competitive strategies. 
Hence, an increase in PME represents or tracks opportunity cost associated with continued 
resource expenditure.  
Let’s take a closer look at the predictions of this view. If PME tracks opportunity cost associated 
with continued resource expenditure, the greater the PME, the greater opportunity cost, as fewer 
resources remain for other tasks. Presumably, the longer this goes on, the harder it gets to recruit 
more resources to the task.  
However, these predictions aren’t exactly borne out. In fact, studies show a decrease instead of 
an increase in PME following ongoing resource allocation (Botvinick et al., 2001, Carter et al., 
2007). Using the Stroop paradigm, Botvinick et al. (2001) showed that incongruent (i.e. 
cognitively demanding) trials induce more PME when such trials are rare in comparison to 
congruent trials in a given set. If hefty resource allocation is rare, they require a total of less 
resource allocation. If they require a total of less resource allocation, they should introduce less 
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opportunity cost (since a lot more resources remain to potentially redeploy elsewhere), and 
trigger less rather than more PME.  
Consider the following analogy. You are asked to jog lightly around the track with intermittent 
sprinting intervals. In scenario one, you jog lightly for two laps with only two 100-meter 
sprinting intervals at the end of each lap, totaling in 600 meters of light jogging and 200 meters 
of sprinting. In scenario two, you sprint every other 100 meters, totaling in 400 meters of 
sprinting and 400 meters of jogging. Which scenario would produce greater feelings of effort: 
600 meters of jogging combined with 200 meters of sprinting or 400 meters of jogging combined 
with 400 meters of sprinting? I can attest that the second scenario would induce greater amount 
of effort phenomenology than the first. 
In sum, if PME is supposed to track opportunity cost associated with resource expenditure, and 
fewer resources are used if a smaller number of demanding tasks are being performed during a 
set interval of time, then subjects should be experiencing less rather than more PME during sets 
with fewer mentally demanding trials.   
Bayne and Levy’s (2006) account of mental effort provides yet another option for the 
intentionalist. Bayne and Levy categorize mental effort as a component of agentive experience. 
According to the authors, “the experience of mental effort involves a representation of the 
utilization and progressive fatigue of mental muscles” (ibid, p.17). In other words, while 
undergoing PME, we represent our use of “mental strength” and the effect this use has on our 
remaining mental resources. Bayne and Levy characterize the phenomenology of mental effort in 
the following way: 
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Anyone who has struggled with a difficult conceptual issue has experienced the effort 
involved in thinking a problem through. It gives rise to characteristic feelings of tiredness 
and a growing urge to stop (ibid, p.13). 
 
This thesis fits well with the opportunity cost view outlined above. After all, resource finitude is 
an essential component of opportunity cost. If the resources are not limited, their allocation does 
not involve an opportunity cost.   
Before going over the empirical details behind this hypothesis, two distinctions should be made 
clear. First, as discussed in the previous section, likening PME to agentive phenomenology 
appears to be on the wrong track. While the latter involves a feeling of control, the former does 
not. Second, it is plausible to distinguish between fatigue phenomenology and effort 
phenomenology. The former involves an awareness of current resource availability, while the 
latter does not. In particular, when you are feeling fatigued, you are aware that you are close to 
not being able to carry on. On the other hand, when you experience effort, you might be unaware 
that you can’t carry on. For instance, say you are running and decide to suddenly increase your 
pace considerably. Unless you’re not used to running, you could very well be aware of applying 
effort, but remain ignorant that you can’t keep up this pace for a long time. On the other hand, if 
you are running and suddenly experience fatigue, you immediately feel that you cannot keep up 
for much longer. Similarly, the phenomenology of mental effort does not have to be 
accompanied by an awareness that you will not be able to carry on for much longer. For 
example, you could feel pleasantly challenged by a crossword puzzle and remain optimistic 
about your ability to carry on indefinitely.   
Nevertheless, for the purposes of this discussion, I am willing to set this distinction aside and 
discuss Bayne and Levy’s thesis as a thesis about the phenomenology of mental effort. To 
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review, Bayne and Levy argue that mental effort phenomenology is a type of agentive 
phenomenology that involves “a representation of the utilization and progressive fatigue of 
mental muscles”.  
While this characterization seems like an attractive option for delineating the representational 
content of PME, it still falls short. Consider the following summary of its shortcomings: 
(a) Unlike the individuals who are unable to feel pain, those who lack PME function 
perfectly well. These cases suggest that the phenomenology of mental effort did 
not evolve to track cognitive resource depletion (i.e., alert the organism of the 
utilization and progressive fatigue of mental muscles). 
(b) Unlike physical energy use, frequent “mental energy” use in a given interval of 
time produces less effort than infrequent energy use.  
(c) No systematic relation indicative of tracking could be established between 
cognitive resource depletion and PME. 
 
Let us take a closer look at (a). An increase in PME is supposed to track increased mental 
resource expenditure because PME evolved to signal resource expenditure.13 Hence, an absence 
of PME would spell malfunction. However, as discussed in the previous section, studies show 
that subjects lacking PME function well.14 Critchley et al. (2003) found that the patients missing 
PME had well-preserved general intellectual functions. They performed generally well on many 
demanding clinical tasks sensitive to frontal executive functions. In sum, while nothing precludes 
us from speculating that PME might turn out to have other (possibly derived) adaptive value, 
tracking cognitive resource depletion does not seem to be it.  
 
13 Recall that according to TI, representation is grounded in evolutionary histories. For example, pain experience 
tracks bodily damage and badness because it was selected to carry information about bodily damage and badness by 
reliably correlating with these features of the environment (Cutter and Tye, 2011). 
14 To review, Naccache et al. (2005) show that subjects’ attentional and cognitive mechanisms function normally in 
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We have already encountered (b) in discussing the opportunity cost account above. Briefly, if 
PME tracks mental resources expenditure, an increase in PME should signal more resource 
expenditure. However, studies show a decrease instead of an increase in PME following ongoing 
resource allocation (Botvinick et al., 2001, Carter et al., 2007). 
A further hurdle for Bayne and Levy’s hypothesis involves narrowing down the notion of 
cognitive resources. After all, a tracking relation should be associated with some measure of 
systematicity. If the concept of cognitive resources defies systematic treatment, then Bayne and 
Levy’s intentionalist characterization of PME is on the wrong track. The systematic nature of the 
tracking relation is nicely summarized by Hilbert and Klien (2014) in the following way.  
Given very general assumptions about physiology and the evolution of nervous systems, 
what is to be expected is that the internal states that track environmental features 
will have some systematic structure (ibid, p. 300) 
 
 How are we to understand the notion of “cognitive resources” and their systematic depletion? 
One non-metaphorical answer is that cognitive resources could be understood in neural terms. In 
other words, cognitive resources are neural changes underlying cognitive resource depletion.   
Is there a systematic relationship between neural resource depletion and PME? In order to 
answer this question, we need to take a closer look at how the current scientific community is 
talking about concepts like “finite capacity” and “neural resources.” What exactly is a “limited 
cognitive resource” and in what way can it become depleted? 
Explaining degrading performance with increased task difficulty has typically been explained by 
metaphorical allusions to “finite working memory capacity” that is spread more “thinly” with 
increased “task load” (Baddeley, 1996). However, any systematic or structural relationship 
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between these placeholders is yet to be empirically demonstrated. Many researchers suggest that 
what creates a tax on attention control processing varies across contexts (Franconeri et al., 2013). 
Perhaps the limitation comes from the nature of neural processing prevalent throughout the 
cortex, i.e., surround inhibition of an activity ‘peak’ of some neural processes on other processes 
in their neighborhood. Franconeri et al. summarize this point in the following way:  
Items interact destructively when they are close enough for their activity 
profiles to overlap, due to the inhibition zone that typically surrounds each 
activity peak. These suppressive surrounds sharpen the activity profiles of 
single items and resolve inter-item competition–a critical step especially 
when unitary actions are needed (e.g., a saccade to a single location) (ibid, 
p.3). 
 
In this two-dimensional ‘map’ architecture, capacity is not fixed but flexible, determined by a 
number of fluctuating variables, i.e., the space taken by the activity profile of certain items on the 
map, how these items interact with one another (e.g., whether they interact constructively or 
destructively is partly determined by the inhibition zone that surrounds each activity peak),  the 
spacing on the items on the map, and so on. All these factors contribute to the competition 
between items at the neural level. As this competition is resolved, a more pronounced activity 
peak takes place. Furthermore, the way these competitive interactions resolve is not fixed but 
flexible. Hence, alluding to a limited capacity that somehow becomes systematically depleted 
with use is misleading. This organization gives the brain an adaptive edge, but it also has side 
effects. Perhaps PME is one such side effect, alerting the organism to no particular state of 
affairs.   
The upshot is that cognitive neuroscience does not provide evidence of a match in structural 
relations between PME and neural changes in the way we have seen between pain 
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phenomenology and somatosensory cortex activation (e.g., Price et al.,1994, illustrate the 
structural relationship between pain intensity and neuron firings in S1). Since tracking relations 
are characterized by a match in systematic relations (e.g., similarity, differences, equal intervals, 
proportions), it does not appear that PME tracks cognitive resource depletion.  
Inzlicht and Marcora (2016) summarize the criticisms of the resource depletion model (i.e., “the 
central governor”) in the following way:  
There is no credible evidence that mental effort actually consumes inordinate 
amounts of energy that are not already circulating in the brain. Recent modifications 
of the model make the central governor appear like an all knowing homunculus and 
unfalsifiable in principle, thus contributing very little to our understanding of why 
people tend to disengage from effortful tasks over time (ibid, p.1)  
 
Hence, it does not appear that Bayne and Levy have provided sufficient reason to think that the 
phenomenology of mental effort tracks mental resource depletion.   
2.4 Conclusion 
To sum up, let us briefly review the main argument for TI and how it fares against PME. Arguments from 
introspective difference state that, necessarily, if there is an introspectable difference in the two 
phenomenal properties of subjects, then there is a difference in the objects and properties those subjects 
represent as in their environment. However, a difference in PME does not accompany a difference in 
either a) representation of the way external features appear, i.e., brighter, with more contrast and so on, b) 
representation of task difficultly, c) judgement of the possibility of error, d) representation of trying to 
achieve some state of affairs, e) representation of bodily changes like muscle tension, f) representation of 
cognitive resource depletion and opportunity cost. 
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While local intentionalism about some phenomenal experiences like pains might obtain, it does not look 
like it obtains for all phenomenal experiences. This puts the intentionalist in an uncomfortable position of 
trying to explain why some phenomenal experiences have representational content and not others. 
Moreover, even if as much as one type of phenomenal experience doesn’t have representational content, 
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The question of what it is for consciousness to be unified has been at the forefront of 
philosophical debates before the advent of empirical perspectives (James, 1890; Kant, 1781). 
A recently revived debate on the unity of consciousness in the split-brain has given new life to 
this investigation (Schechter, 2018; Pinto et. al., 2017; Corballis et. al., 2018). In subjects with 
the split-brain syndrome, some conscious states appear to be disunified (e.g., visual states), while 
others remain unified (e.g., affective states). While placing emphasis on the disunities, disunity 
accounts conclude that split-brain subjects have two subjective perspectives and not one 
(Schechter, 2018; Gazzaniga & LeDoux, 1978). That is, there is something that it’s like to be the 
left hemisphere, and something that it’s like to be the right hemisphere, but nothing that it’s like 
to be the entire subject of experience. 
In this work I argue that affective unity is more important than perceptual disunity in delineating 
our subjective perspective. Hence, split-brain patients retain a unified subjective perspective on 
the world. Unlike enjoying an objective perspective, enjoying a subjective perspective entails 
experiencing aspects of your phenomenal field in terms of their overall relation to you. That is, 
what it’s like to be you at any given time entails experiencing certain aspects of the phenomenal 
field as peripheral to others. Since emotion plays a greater role than perception in creating and 
sustaining this periphery/center structure, affective unity is more important than perceptual 
disunity in delineating what it’s like to be you at any given time. 
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Emotion creates and sustains a center/periphery structure in our phenomenal field by signaling 
orders of perceived importance as well as orders of perceived changeability (e.g., to someone 
feeling grief, the experience of getting a parking ticket is felt as peripheral/unimportant to the 
experience of grief; to someone feeling depressed, the experience of reaching a hilltop is felt as 
peripheral/unattainable to the experience of laying down to rest) (Oatley and Jenkins, 1996; 
Schnall et. al., 2008). 
While a lack of interhemispheric integration in the split-brain might be damaging to the 
subjective perspective, it is not enough to split the subjective perspective into two. The resultant 
verdict helps explain some of the main objections to disunity models, i.e. the relative lack of 
impairments suffered by split-brain subjects in everyday life, as well as the eventual dissipation 
of apparent disunity under experimental conditions.i  
 
3.2 The Split-Brain Syndrome and the Duality Account   
The split-brain syndrome results from a procedure severing the corpus collosum between the two 
hemispheres in varying degrees.ii While the surgery fulfills its goal in reducing seizures, it has 
subtle effects on the patient’s consciousness. These effects are subtle in that everyday life seems 
largely unaffected.  
The effects of the surgery are tested using an experimental set up designed to prevent the two 
hemispheres from interacting in an indirect way.iii Roughly, an indirect exchange of information 
is a way in which two distinct minds might interact. Indirect interaction between mental states 
would entail something like tracing out the information presented to one hemisphere with one’s 
hand or using perceptual cues to get the information across to the other hemisphere. Since we are 
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interested in the way the subject’s (putatively single) mind might process information, the design 
includes perceptual lateralization, response control, and prevention of cross-cuing. Consider the 
following description of a typical split-brain experiment: 
Two stimuli are presented to the patient in such a way that one will be 
processed by the left hemisphere and the other by the right hemisphere. 
For example, the word ‘keyring’ might be projected such that ‘key’ is 
restricted to the patient’s left visual field (LVF), and ‘ring’ is restricted 
to the patient’s right visual field (RVF). The contralateral structure of 
the visual system ensures that stimuli projected to the LVF are 
processed in the right hemisphere and vice-versa. Other perceptual 
systems can be studied in a similar manner. For example, tactile 
perception is examined by asking the patient to compare an object 
presented to the right hand with one presented to the left (Bayne, 2008, 
p.278). 
 
This experimental set up allegedly reveals two types of disunities in split-brain patients, i.e. 
behavioral disunities and representational disunities (Bayne, 2008). When carefully prompted (as 
to prevent cross-cuing), split-brain patients are behaviorally disunified in that a patient will only 
verbally report what was presented to the left hemisphere, e.g., the word ‘ring’; but will use her 
left hand to pick out what was presented to the right hemisphere, e.g., the picture of a ‘key’.iv 
Moreover, patients appear to be representationally disunified in that the representations of ‘key’ 
and ‘ring’ are never combined into a unified representation of ‘key-ring’. While experimental 
findings suggest that both representations are individually conscious, they are nonetheless not 
co-conscious.   
Importantly for our purposes, theorists have been careful to note that emotional states remain 
unified even under experimental conditions. Sperry describes this phenomenon in the following 
way:  
Unlike other aspects of cognitive function, emotions have never been 
readily confinable to one hemisphere…the emotional effects spread 
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rapidly to involve both hemispheres, apparently through crossed fiber 
systems in the undivided brain stem (Sperry, 1982, p.1225).   
   
For example, if the right hemisphere is shown a disturbing film from the subject’s left visual 
field, the entire subject experiences fear. One participant describes her experience after viewing 
the film in the following way: “I don’t really know why I’m kind of scared. I feel jumpy….” 
(Gazzaniga, 1985, p. 76).  
Consider a similar experiment. Geometric shapes were shown to either the right hemisphere (on 
the left visual field) or the left hemisphere (on the right visual field). 
One young male patient was tested with the hemi-field tachistoscopic 
technique which allows visual presentation of stimuli to only one 
visual half-field at a time. With his gaze focused on a central fixation 
point on the screen, different simple configurations were flashed 
quickly one at a time either to the left or to the right side of the point 
and the task was to name them. He had no difficulty in naming those 
flashed on the right side of the fixation point (the information was 
transmitted to the left, speaking hemisphere) but he was unable to 
name simple geometrical configurations on the left (information was 
transmitted only to the right, mute hemisphere). He attempted guesses 
or simply said he was unable to name the image. “One of the 
configurations that was projected on the left was that of a swastika. 
Unlike any of the previous reactions in earlier trials, he immediately 
sat back in his chair exclaiming. ‘What was this that you just showed 
me!’. What do you think it was, asked the experimenter. He replied, ‘A 
terrible thing, an awful thing.’ You did not like it, stated the 
experimenter. ‘No, I didn’t,’ he replied, shaking his head. Was it a 
good thing or a bad one, probed the experimenter (who did not 
anticipate strong reactions to any of the items in the set) ‘Bad, very 
bad,’ replied the patient. He was never able to name it…” (Zaidel, 
1994: 171). 
  
While only the right hemisphere was shown the swastika; the left hemisphere reported the 
affective phenomenology, suggesting that affect was likely experienced by the entire subject. In 
the following sections, I propose to take a closer look at emotion’s role in the unity of 
consciousness.   
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3.3 What is a Subjective Perspective? 
Before we analyze experimental findings in more detail, it would be useful to get a handle of the 
notion of a subjective perspective. To have a subjective perspective on the world is for there to 
be something that it's like to be that being (Nagel, 1974). To review, according to the disunity 
accounts, there is something that it’s like to be the left hemisphere, and something that it’s like to 
be the right hemisphere, but nothing that it’s like to be the entire subject of experience. 
How does a subjective perspective differ from an objective perspective? Using a visual analogy, 
a perspective is a point of view that establishes spatial relations in terms of their overall relation 
to the perceiver.v That is, every visual perspective has a structure where some parts of the scene 
are experienced as peripheral to others. For example, in focusing on the computer screen in front 
of me, I automatically “zoom out” from the photograph on the right side of my desk. Watzl 
describes this phenomenon in the following way: “Attending to something consists in structuring 
the stream of consciousness into center and periphery” (Watzl, 2010; p.7).  
A similar line of thought could be applied to our overall subjective perspective on the world. 
Like visual attention, emotion plays a structuring role in our overall point of view. It does so by 
purporting to signal relations of relative importance from our point of view. For example, as 
you’re suddenly hit with feelings of grief, you experience the rest of the world in relation to your 
grief. Other everyday concerns like getting a parking ticket fade into the periphery of your grief. 
In other words, undergoing an emotional experience creates and sustains central/peripheral 
relations between aspects of your experience (e.g., Oatley and Jenkins, 1996). Emotion’s 
structuring role on our point of view also shows up in colloquial expressions. For example, an 
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emotional subject with a momentarily narrow perspective on the world could be described as 
“blind with rage” or “blinded by love”.  
Notably, since emotions could be misleading, they only purport to signal the relative importance 
of things from our point of view. For example, someone losing their cool on the road might 
momentarily feel like a victim of an important injustice, only to realize his overreaction a second 
later.  
In short, our point of view on the world is inherently bound up with our emotional experiences. 
Emotion structures our phenomenal field by bringing certain elements into the center and others 
into the periphery.  
One might object that emotion is not the only type of phenomenology with a power to structure 
our point of view. After all, vision also creates and sustains phenomenal relations between items 
in your phenomenal field. Going back to the example above, focusing on the computer screen in 
front of me pushes the rest of the room into the periphery. Since experimental findings suggest 
that visual states are indeed disunified in the split brain, why should we prioritize emotional 
unity over visual disunity?    
To understand why emotion plays a greater role than vision in structuring our subjective 
perspective, consider the following example. Say you’re visually attending to the television 
screen in front of you that takes up the majority of your visual field. Suddenly, from the very 
corner of your eye, you spot your partner’s terrified face. Even without moving your eyes, your 
entire subjective perspective on the world shifts. Despite the fact that the television screen still 
takes up the majority of your visual perspective, what it’s like to be you is largely determined by 
your affective experience. In other words, even though your visual attention is fixed on the 
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screen, your affective experience causes you to experience the screen as peripheral to the 
terrified face (Ohman et. al., 2001a). The TV screen is no longer important since your partner 
might be facing a dangerous threat. In short, while vision has the capacity to structure your visual 
perspective, your overall subjective perspective on the world is largely determined by affect.   
A further objection could be spelled out in the following way. If one is accustomed to the 
misleading nature of one’s emotions, one’s point of view may no longer be structured by these 
emotions. For example, someone struggling with depression might no longer experience these 
feelings from the first-person point of view. Instead, one could learn to distance oneself from 
these feelings and gain a certain level of dissociation. For instance, the onset of these emotions 
could trigger the following feelings in a weary subject: “I am so tired of feelings this way… this 
is not really me!” or “Here I go again focusing on my failings, but I know from experience that 
things aren’t really as bad as they seem!” In other words, even if depressive emotions push the 
experience of one’s failures into the center and achievements into the periphery, one could still 
occupy a point of view outside these experiences. Hence, if one experiences these emotions from 
the third person point of view, one’s subjective perspective would no longer be structured by 
these emotions.  
Several replies are available. First, it is notable that feeling dissociated is still a type of emotional 
experience. In this example, the subject struggles with depression and over time has developed 
certain feelings towards his illness. Having grown “sick and tired” of feeling a certain way, he 
has developed negative emotions about his emotional tendencies. Hence, it is still the case that 
emotions structure his point of view, even if these emotions have other emotions as their objects.  
Secondly, the very notion of “struggling” implies that his depressive feelings still very much 
structure his subjective perspective on the world. Unable to just wish them away, their onset still 
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pushes certain elements into the foreground and others in the periphery. Hence, it is still the case 
that emotions structure his point of view, even if he wishes that weren’t the case.  
Lastly, feeling dissociated from one’s emotional experiences is not the norm for most people. 
Rather than constantly double-checking whether they’re being led astray, non-clinical 
populations experience emotions more or less full-heartedly. Hence, it is still the case that 
emotions structure one’s point of view, even if these emotions are more complex than previously 
suggested.  
3.3.1 Subjective Perspective and Feelings of Agency  
So far, we have seen that emotion structures our point of view by bringing seemingly important 
elements into the center and other seemingly unimportant elements into the periphery. In this 
section I further this argument by outlining affect’s role in feelings of agency. In particular, in 
addition to structuring our phenomenal field by orders of perceived importance, emotion also 
structures our phenomenal field by orders of perceived changeability (e.g., Gibson, 1979; Noe 
2004; O’Regan, 2011). For example, a depressed traveler might perceive a tree at the top of a 
steep hill as unreachable, while an excited child might perceive it as just “a hop away” (Schnall 
et. al., 2008). In other words, the depressed traveler’s emotions almost “push” the tree further 
into the periphery by determining his felt inability to reach it. This line of thought is confirmed 
by empirical findings. Specifically, according to the affective coding hypothesis, affect 
modulates feelings of (i) prospective agency, (ii) real-time agency, and (iii) post-hoc judgements 
of agency (Gentsch and Synofzik, 2015).vi  
Hence, if split-brain patients remain affectively unified under experimental conditions, they also 
remain agentially unified. Recent findings from the split-brain paradigm lend support to this 
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hypothesis. In their recent work “Split-Brain: Divided Perception but Undivided Consciousness”, 
Pinto et. al. show that while visual perception could be split and processed independently by 
each hemisphere, consciousness is nonetheless unified. The authors summarize their findings in 
the following way:  
The canonical idea of split-brain patients is that they cannot compare 
stimuli across visual half-fields (left), because visual processing is not 
integrated across hemispheres. This is what we found as well. 
However, another key element of the traditional view is that split-brain 
patients can only respond accurately to stimuli in the left visual field 
with their left hand and to stimuli in the right visual field with their 
right hand and verbally. This is not what we found. Across a wide 
variety of tasks, we observed that split-brain patients could reliably 
indicate presence, location, orientation and identity of stimuli 
throughout the entire visual field regardless of how they responded 
(ibid, p.1232).  
 
It appears that contra previous findings of behavioral disunity, split-brain patients are indeed 
agentially unified in that they’re able to respond accurately to stimuli presented anywhere in the 
visual field, using any response modality (e.g., both left and right hands as well as verbal report). 
These findings of agential unity in the split-brain lend support to our hypothesis that affective 
unity structures our point of view by determining our felt ability to act on the world. Since their 
experience of agency is already determined by the shared affect, split-brain subjects under 
experimental conditions do not experience themselves to be passive with respect to actions that 
might have originated in one opposite hemisphere. 
Someone might object to this notion of structuring in the following way. According to this 
proposal, emotion doesn’t only structure elements in the phenomenal field by orders of perceived 
importance, but also by orders of perceived changeability. For the example, a depressed traveler 
might feel the hilltop to be unsurmountable and thus experience it as peripheral to the nice 
comfy bench right next to him. However, it is not always the case that things that are 
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experienced as unchangeable or unattainable occupy the periphery of our consciousness. In fact, 
someone feeling depressed might become excessively preoccupied with things she finds 
unattainable (e.g., having a stress-free workday). In other words, experiencing things as 
unattainable might actually push them into the center and not the periphery of one’s phenomenal 
field.  
This example features an interesting interplay between the two notions of structuring (i.e., 
structuring in order of perceived importance and structuring in order of perceived changeability). 
In particular, it appears that one’s phenomenal field could feature two layers. In this case, the 
first layer is structured by orders of perceived changeability. In other words, one’s depression has 
moved imagined experiences like having a stress-free workday into the periphery of one’s 
phenomenal field. Given one’s illness, having an “episode free” workday just seems unattainable 
and really “far away”. The second layer is structured by one’s affective attitude towards this 
attainability. In particular, one’s affective attitude or felt preoccupation towards this attainability 
has pushed it into the center of one’s consciousness.     
3.4 Objection from Cortical Integration  
So far, I have argued for the following conclusion. Emotion structures our subjective perspective 
by pushing certain elements to the center and others to the periphery. Furthermore, affect has the 
power to structure our subjective perspective by determining our felt ability to make changes to 
these elements. In order to develop this view further, I propose to turn our attention to several 
objections from the disunity account.  
According to the integration model of consciousness, integration is necessary for a unified 
subjective perspective on the world. Since split-brain subjects suffer a lack of cortical integration 
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due to a severed corpus collosum, split-brain subjects do not enjoy a unified subjective 
perspective on the world.   
In particular, Schechter’s duality account makes use of the global workspace model of 
consciousness (e.g., Dahaene et. al., 2011). According to this model, what makes a mental state 
conscious is that its content becomes available to multiple reasoning systems simultaneously.  
Speaking somewhat metaphorically, we can say that two centers of consciousness were formed 
the moment the right hemisphere became conscious of the percept “ring”, and the left 
hemisphere become conscious of the percept “key”. That is, while each bit was integrated within 
each hemisphere (e.g., two separate percepts gave rise to two separate beliefs), the absence of a 
corpus collosum prevented the entire content “key-ring” from being integrated 
interhemispherically. 
Nevertheless, it is not the case that cortical integration houses the only attentional mechanisms in 
the brain. In fact, several lines of evidence suggest that low-level affect plays an attention-like 
role in organizing sensory, cognitive, and agentive elements into a seemingly coherent whole 
(Pourtois et al., 2012; Vuilleumier and Schwartz, 2001b; Fox, 2002; Grabowska et al., 2011). 
The first line of evidence comes from Pourtois’ Multiple Attention Gain Control model. 
According to this model, sub-cortically realized affective states compete with attentional 
mechanisms realized by cortical integration (Pourtois et. al, 2012; Gentsch and Synofzik, 2015; 
Corballis et. al., 2018). This model details systematic dissociations between cortically realized 
attentional mechanisms and sub-cortically realized affective mechanisms in organizing conscious 
states (Pourtois et al., 2012). Since the two depend on non-overlapping circuits, attentional and 
affective organizing effects could be pitted against one another in experimental conditions 
(Corbetta and Shulman, 2002). According to this model, “emotion signals can shape perception 
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by mechanisms that do not overlap with other (e.g., endogenous or voluntary) attentional 
processes” (ibid, p. 505). These affective mechanisms operate very similarly to low-level 
organizing principles like attention and structure perceptual inputs into recognizable 
configurations (Vuilleumier et. al., 2001; McMains and Kastner, 2011). 
Furthermore, given that these effects are impenetrable to manipulations of attentional control 
mechanisms (e.g., either endogenous or exogenous selective attention), these affective 
mechanisms could operate independently of attentional mechanisms. Consider the following 
summary of the dissociation data:  
Patients with neglect or visual extinction suffer from selective damage 
to fronto-parietal networks controlling spatial (endogenous and/or 
exogenous) attention and show severe deficits in orienting their 
attention towards the contralesional side of space, but emotional biases 
in spatial orienting may still occur despite the overall neglect biases 
(Vuilleumier and Schwartz, 2001b; Fox, 2002; Grabowska et al., 
2011). 
 
Additional evidence for the independence of affective and cortical attentional mechanisms could 
be found in neuroimaging studies on hemispatial neglect following parietal damage (Vuilleumier 
et al., 2002; Grabowska et al., 2011). Patients with hemispatial neglect fail to orient to stimuli in 
the (usually left) space opposite to their (usually right) brain lesion, due to a destruction of brain 
networks controlling spatial attention towards that side (Driver and Vuilleumier, 2001). 
However, even while exogenous and endogenous attentional mechanisms are impaired, 
emotional stimuli still serve attention-like role in orienting subjects to stimuli in the space 
opposite to their brain lesion (Vuilleumier and Schwartz, 2001a; Fox, 2002; Lucas and 
Vuilleumier, 2008; Grandjean et al., 2008; Grabowska et al., 2011).  
 Furthermore, it appears that sub-cortically realized affective mechanisms arrive on the scene prior 
to attentional mechanisms of cortical integration (Pourtois et al., 2010b; Luo et al., 2010; Brosch et 
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al., 2011; Ciesielski et al., 2010). Consider the following summary of the two key claims of the 
model (my emphasis):  
(i) The time-course of emotional effects suggests a distinctive spatio-temporal dynamic as 
compared with other attentional modulations (in fronto-parietal areas), with relatively 
early responses observed in some limbic regions, such as the amygdala or orbitofrontal 
cortex (Kawasaki et al., 2001), which might then act to gate sensory processing in 
distant regions at later latencies. 
(ii) These emotional attention effects may occur in parallel to other gating effects mediated 
by fronto-parietal attention networks (Amaral et al., 2003; Krolak-Salmon et al., 2001; 
Vuilleumier and Pourtois, 2007; Pourtois et al. 2010a, [b] 2010) and thus be partly 
independent of (or even competing with) any concomitant modulation by the latter 
systems (ibid, p.7). 
 
Further evidence of affect’s attention-like role in organizing our conscious experience comes 
from findings on inter-modal integration. In particular, it is commonly assumed that inter-modal 
integration is a perceptual phenomenon that takes place more or less automatically (Alais and 
Burr, 2004). For example, the “ventriloquist effect” is believed to be an automatic, cross-modal 
phenomenon. In experiencing this effect, we attach the perceived location of an auditory 
stimulus to a concurrently presented visual stimulus. The magnitude of the effect is supposed to 
reflect the extent of this audiovisual binding.  
However, Maiworm et. al., (2012) demonstrated emotion’s orchestrating role in this multi-
sensory integration. The authors showed a reduction of the ventriloquist effect following emotion 
stimulus manipulation (ibid, p.102). The control conditions revealed that it is unlikely that the 
effect resulted in merely enhanced processing of the auditory information. Instead, the affective 
stimulus present in the auditory modality modulated the multimodal integration in favor of 
audition, reversing the previously assumed automaticity of visual dominance.  
In sum, it appears that affect plays an attention-like role in directing how each modality interacts 
with another or if a given modality gets to contribute at all. Hence, since affective attentional 
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mechanisms are indeed preserved in the split-brain, a lack of interhemispheric integration is not 
enough to split the subjective perspective into two.  
 
3.5 The Compatibility Objection   
While Schechter grants that some affective states might be shared between the two hemispheres, 
she argues that shared affect is compatible with the disunity account. This objection could be 
broken down into two parts: (i) argument from architectural assumptions of the mind, and (ii) 
argument from the type/token distinction. According to the former, “all the shared affect in the 
world cannot dissolve the boundaries of individual psychologies” (ibid, p.110). Schechter 
formalizes these architectural assumptions in the following way:  
At a minimum, the objection to the duality account should show that 
R’s mental activities interact with L’s substantially directly, rather than 
mainly in a way that multiple minds characteristically interact, that is 
via paired re/action and sensation/perception. Ideally, the objection 
would also show that R and L do not separately but together meet the 
architectural assumptions. It would show that R and L’s activities 
interact in a way we would expect the mental states of a single mind to 
interact – for instance, with LH percepts leading to the formation of 
RH perceptual beliefs (ibid, p.110).   
 
In sum, even if affect remains unified in the split-brain, lack of direct formation of perceptual 
beliefs from the opposite hemisphere’s perceptions violates basic “architectural assumptions” of 
the mind. 
The second strand of this objection makes use of the type/token distinction to neutralize the 
significance of shared affect in the split-brain. In particular, Schechter argues that while the 
affective state type is shared, each hemisphere creates its own conscious experience token by 
providing its own “readout” of the shared state.vii In other words, the general affective type like 
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negative mood does not belong to any subjective perspective prior to becoming available for 
“broadcast” within each hemisphere.  
Several replies are available. First, the architectural characterization makes use of the assumption 
that activities within a single mind are organized via attentional mechanisms realized by cortical 
integration. However, we’ve seen some reasons to doubt that cortical integration is the only 
means for a single mind to ensure internal interaction. In fact, there is already some integration 
of information going on via sub-cortically realized affective mechanisms, and a lack of cortical 
interhemispheric integration is not enough to split this unified perspective into two.  
Along the same lines, it is difficult to understand why two independent subjective perspectives 
would be created when there is already a perfectly good subjective perspective on the scene. 
Specifically, the independence and unique timescale of affective and attentional mechanisms 
detailed in the previous section suggests that cognitive interpretations of affective 
phenomenology may proceed independently of these low-level organizing effects and create 
additional mental states without canceling out the initial phenomenal feels in the split-brain. 
Thus, it is not the case that shared affect does not belong to any subjective perspective prior to 
intra-hemispheric cortical integration, i.e. that there is nothing that it’s like to be the entire 
subject of experience of these low-level affective states, even if the later interpretations by each 
hemisphere may create additional mental states.  
Furthermore, contra the type/token characterization, even if the later interpretations provided by 
each hemisphere are capable of creating additional conscious states, it does not mean that these 
two new states would now belong to two independent subjective perspectives. In particular, we 
have no reason to suspect that the right hemisphere’s new elaborate affective state would interact 
with the left hemisphere’s new elaborate affective state “in a way we would expect two distinct 
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minds to interact” (ibid, p. 110). Instead, we would see that these two new states would “interact 
in a way we would expect the mental states of a single mind to interact – for instance, with LH’s 
emotions leading to the formation of RH’s emotional beliefs” (ibid, p.110).viii  
For instance, say that both hemispheres experience a general shared negative affect. However, 
while the left hemisphere is primed with pictures of financial loss, the right hemisphere is primed 
with pictures of health troubles. So while the left hemisphere thinks that it feels terrible because 
of financial loss, the right hemisphere thinks that it feels terrible because of health troubles. 
Nevertheless, if the right hemisphere were asked whether it would like to donate a large sum to 
charity, it would likely decline; and if the left hemisphere were asked whether it would like to 
decrease the deductible on health insurance, it would likely agree.  
Hence, the emotional state of the right hemisphere would indeed give rise to (emotional) beliefs 
and decisions of the left hemisphere and the emotional state of the left hemisphere would indeed 
give rise to (emotional) beliefs and decisions of the right hemisphere. Thus, by Schechter’s own 
architectural standards, each hemisphere’s conscious states would interact with the other 
hemisphere’s conscious states in a way we would expect two states of a single, albeit fuzzy, mind 
to interact.      
Final reasons to doubt that the left hemisphere’s and the right hemisphere’s two elaborate 
affective states would belong to two independent subjective perspectives comes from our pre-
theoretical intuitions about the structure of the subjective perspective. Since your affective 
experiences largely determine what it’s like to be you at any point in time, further cognitive 
interpretations will not create two new subjective perspectives, but merely change details in the 
point of view already anchored by affect.  
3.5.1 Objection from Visual Representational Disunity  
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So far, we have seen some reasons to believe that split-brain patients retain a unified subjective 
perspective on the world. If so, how do we make sense of the findings indicating a lack of 
representational integration between the visual representations “key” and “ring” under 
experimental conditions? In other words, if affect has the power to organize one’s subjective 
perspective into a seemingly coherent whole, why doesn’t it “pull” visual representations of 
“key” and “ring” into a unified whole?  
To understand why visual representational disunity is compatible with a unified subjective 
perspective, consider the distinction between phenomenal and access consciousness. In 
particular, a lack of visual representational disunity only shows a lack of unified access 
consciousness and not a lack of unified phenomenal consciousness (Bayne and Chalmers, 2003). 
Furthermore, not only does phenomenal unity survive access disunities in the split-brain, it might 
benefit at their expense (Jolij & Lamme, 2005).  
Many philosophers distinguish between access consciousness and phenomenal consciousness 
(Block, 1995; Bayne and Chalmers, 2003). Roughly, a state is access conscious when its content 
is available for verbal report and rational inference. On the other hand, a state is phenomenally 
conscious when there is something that it’s like to be in that state, but its content is not available 
for verbal report, reasoning systems, and rational behavioral control. According to Block, states 
could be phenomenally conscious without being access conscious and vice versa. For example, 
someone intensely focused on his conversation might be phenomenally conscious of the 
background noise in his surroundings, but only become access conscious of the noise once the 
conversation dies down (Block, 1995).  
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Let’s take a look at Bayne and Chalmers’ proposal in more detail. Even in non-clinical subjects, 
access to experiences could be limited by limitations in attentional resources. Consider the 
following example of this limitation: 
Perhaps the clearest example of such a bottleneck is given by a famous 
experiment by George Sperling (1960). In Sperling’s experiment, a 
subject is presented with a matrix consisting of three rows with four 
letters each. The matrix is flashed only briefly, for 250 milliseconds. 
After the matrix vanishes, a tone sounds, indicating whether the 
subject is to report the contents of the first, second, or third row. When 
subjects are required to report the contents of the top row, on average 
they correctly report 3.3 of the four letters in that row. The same goes 
when they are required to report the contents of the middle row, or of 
the bottom row. But when subjects are asked to report the contents of 
the entire matrix, on average they correctly report 4.5 of the twelve 
letters. So, to simplify a little, it seems that the subject has access to 
the information in any single row, but the subject does not have joint 
access to the information in all three rows (ibid, p.15).  
 
This distinction could carry itself to different types of co-consciousness in the split-brain. In 
particular, co-consciousness could amount to the following relations: co-accessibility and co-
phenomenality (e.g., Schechter, 2018; Bayne and Chalmers, 2003; Bayne, 2010). Two states are 
access-unified if the conjunction of their contents is available for verbal report, reasoning, and 
rational behavioral control. For example, if mental state G has content P and mental state R has 
content Q, these states will be individually access-conscious if the information ‘that P’ is 
available for report and rational control, and if the information ‘that Q’ is available for report and 
rational control. They will be access-unified, if the information “that P&Q” is available for report 
and rational control (Bayne and Chalmers, 2003, p.8). On the other hand, if two experiences are 
co-phenomenal, there is something that it’s like for the subject to undergo them simultaneously 
as opposed to on separate occasions. For example, there is something that it’s like to hear a 
guitar and smell a rose together at t1, as opposed to hearing a guitar at t1 and smelling a rose at 
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t2. According to Chalmers and Bayne, what it means for a subject’s phenomenal consciousness 
to be unified is for all the relevant phenomenal states to be subsumed under a total phenomenal 
state or phenomenal field. This total state amounts to something that it’s like to be the subject of 
experience at t1 or the subject’s subjective perspective. Specifically, experiences are 
phenomenally unified just in case they stand in this subsumption relation to the total phenomenal 
state. States A and B are unified just in case there is one total state (M) that subsumes A and B. 
For example, the total phenomenal state M (hearing a guitar and smelling a rose together) 
subsumes the phenomenal states of A (smelling a rose) and B (hearing a guitar).  
Notably, while my definition of a unified phenomenal perspective slightly diverges from the one 
offered by Bayne and Chalmers, the main distinction between access and phenomenal 
consciousness still applies.ix The standard ‘key-ring’ experiment described in the beginning of 
this paper seems to provide prima facie evidence that split-brain subjects do not enjoy unified 
access consciousness. It appears that one hemisphere is access conscious of the word ‘key’, 
while the other is access conscious of the word ‘ring’; but no one is access conscious of the 
unified word ‘key-ring’. The disunity accounts conclude that perhaps there is someone (the right 
hemisphere) undergoing what it’s like to see ‘key’, and someone (the left hemisphere) 
undergoing what it’s like to see ‘ring’, but no one is undergoing the unified perception ‘key-
ring’. Hence, it appears there are really two subjective perspectives and not one.  
However, Bayne and Chalmers point out that simply because the joint content “key-ring” is not 
available for report, it does not show that the subject does not enjoy one total phenomenal state 
that subsumes the phenomenology of “key” and “ring”. The authors conclude by emphasizing 
that “there is nothing paradoxical or contradictory about this…this is just what we might expect” 
(ibid, p.16).  
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Nevertheless, Schechter is not impressed with this treatment of the split-brain data. According to 
Schechter, not only does the appeal to unified phenomenal consciousness seem incomplete, it 
also comes at a cost to intelligibility. Schechter emphasizes the role of access conscious in our 
introspective experience (my emphasis):  
It is not immediately clear what it would mean for consciousness to be 
unified while conscious perception was split, since so much of 
conscious experience (or perhaps all of it; Carruthers, 2011) is 
perceptual in nature (ibid, p.40).  
 
In the previous sections we’ve seen some reasons to doubt that all consciousness is perceptual in 
nature. In fact, some conscious states, in particular affective phenomenal states do not appear to 
be perceptual in nature.  
Why do phenomenal unity and access unity come apart? Philosophers theorize that access could 
be limited by limitations in attentional resources (Bayne and Chalmers, 2003; Block; 2005). 
There are simply not enough attentional resources to ensure that all conscious states get 
broadcasted to all reasoning systems. However, the existence of bottleneck does not explain the 
exact relationship between access and phenomenal consciousness. The bottleneck explanation 
seems to suggest that allocation of states into access and phenomenal consciousness is a mere 
side-effect of the attentional bottleneck. In other words, there is nothing about access disunity 
itself that triggers phenomenal unity. Furthermore, affect is just another phenomenal state like 
visual phenomenology that could either make it into access consciousness or not.   
I suggest that affective states play a special role in this dissociation. Moreover, there is 
something about access disunity itself that triggers phenomenal unity. Studies on affective 
blindsight show that it is only when affectively salient stimuli are shown below the threshold 
associated with cortical integration and access consciousness, that subjects experience an intense 
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phenomenal state (e.g. Killgore and Yurgelun-Todd, 2004). In particular, Jolij and Lamme 
(2005) show that blocking the cortical route associated with attentional integration and access 
consciousness (interfering with V1 activity) via TMS greatly activates the subcortical pathway to 
the amygdala (likely via the midbrain and the thalamus), thereby blocking perception but 
facilitating affective discrimination (e.g. Killgore & Yurgelun-Todd, 2004).x However, if the 
affective stimulus is shown just above the threshold associated with access consciousness and 
cortical integration, (i.e. when the stimuli are clearly presented), intense affective 
phenomenology and affective discrimination are absent.  
Surprisingly, there appears to be a causal relationship between the quality of access 
consciousness and the quality of phenomenal consciousness. Subjects report a greater affective 
phenomenology following poor quality of access consciousness.  
The causal relationship between access disunity and phenomenal unity makes sense in 
evolutionary terms. That is, when affectively tagged information is not fully available to 
reasoning systems, the brain reacts by upping the feeling of unified subjectivity and agential 
unity, marshalling greater effort into securing a unified front for facing potential threats. Since 
the sub-cortical system is evolutionarily prior, it is likely more apt for detecting coarse changes 
in the environment, and coarse changes are likely affectively tagged (Corballis et. al., 2018).  
In sum, it is unlikely that a lack of unified access consciousness would result in two subjective 
perspectives and not one. Since perception takes a backseat to emotion in structuring our point of 
view, our subjective perspective can survive perceptual disunities.  
3.6 Conclusions  
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In this work I have offered several reasons to suspect that split-brain patients enjoy a unified 
subjective perspective on the world. In particular, since affective unity is more important than 
perceptual disunity in delineating our subjective perspective, split-brain subjects remain 
phenomenally unified and only suffer disunities in access consciousness.  
Affective unity is more important than perceptual disunity since emotion plays a structuring role 
in our subjective perspective. Emotion structures our subjective perspective by bringing certain 
elements into the center and others into the periphery. It does so by signaling orders of perceived 
importance and perceived changeability.  
Arguably, perceived importance and changeability these are the most important aspects of a 
subjective point of view or what it’s like to be you at any given time. In other words, if someone 
is tasked with figuring out what it’s like to experience the world from X’s point of view, they 
would do well by first ascertaining what X finds important and what X finds changeable.   
Hence, as long as the structuring states remain unified, our subjective perspective can survive 
disunities in the details. While a lack of interhemispheric integration in the split-brain might be 
damaging to the subjective perspective, it is nonetheless not enough to split the subjective 
perspective into two. The resultant verdict helps explain some of the main objections to disunity 
models, i.e., the relative lack of impairments suffered by split-brain subjects in everyday life, as 
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Chapter 4: Mindreading, Emotion-
Regulation, and Oppression  
 
4.1 Introduction 
Folk psychology refers to the commonsense cognitive framework people use in order to 
“comprehend, predict, explain, and manipulate” behavior and mental states (Churchland, 1994, 
p. 308). Theorists interested in folk psychology commonly accept that people coordinate their 
lives via attributing propositional attitudes like beliefs and desires.15 Until recently, most 
theorists have argued that people attribute propositional attitudes (henceforth APA) in order to 
secure epistemic benefits like prediction and explanation. These abilities are realized in our 
psychology via either theoretical (e.g., Carruthers, 1996) or simulative mechanisms (e.g., 
Goldman, 2006).  
Recently, some theorists have shifted the focus away from epistemic towards practical functions 
of APA (e.g., McGeer, 2015; Zawidzki, 2008). According to the mindshaping account, we do not 
attribute propositional attitudes for the sake of prediction and explanation, but in order to shape 
mental states in accordance with social norms. According to these theorists, APA abilities 
evolved to promote cooperation via a bi-directional exchange of justifications (McGeer, 2015; 
Zawidzki, 2013).   
 
15 Most theories draw a distinction between “high-level” and “low-level” mindreading (Goldman, 2006; Waytz and 
Mitchell, 2011). Roughly, “low-level” mindreading is “mirror-based” mindreading of emotions, intentions, and 
sensory states (e.g. he is angry at the referee, he’s reaching for the ball); while the “high-level” mindreading 
involves attributions of propositional attitudes (e.g. she believes that I’m trying to deceive her). 
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In this work I incorporate mechanistic details behind theorizing and simulation to outline two 
underappreciated practical functions APA. In particular, I present converging empirical findings 
to show that theorizing and simulation evolved for navigating interpersonal emotional struggles.   
To start, folk psychologists have underappreciated the need for emotion regulation in 
interpersonal coordination (Singer, 2006; Decety, 2014). Unregulated interpersonal emotions 
drain attentional resources necessary for interpersonal coordination (Decety, 2014, p.103). 
Secondly, contra the mindshaping account, findings suggest that our cognitive mechanisms 
evolved to ensure a hierarchical and not a bi-directional exchange of justifications (e.g., 
Cummins, 1999; Cheng and Tracy, 2014; Hawley, 1999). In particular, those with dominant 
access to group resources work to maintain the status quo by collecting justifications from their 
low-ranking counterparts, and not vice versa (e.g., Cummins, 1999; Cheng and Tracy, 2014; 
Hawley, 1999). 
Looking closely at the mechanistic details behind theorizing and simulation reveals how social 
coordination survives these affective burdens. Findings suggest that while theorizing fosters 
emotional distance by “reframing” affective cues from a 3rd person point of view, simulation 
fosters interpersonal intimacy (Gross and Thompson, 2007; Liotti and Gilbert, 2010; Galinsky et 
al., 2005). As a result, theorizing and simulation likely evolved for navigating the affective 
burdens of emotion regulation and social inequality. While theorizing allowed dominant 
individuals to manipulate norm violators without succumbing to interpersonal emotions, 
simulation allowed the oppressed to form intimate alliances amongst themselves.  
This account not only heeds insights from both epistemic and mindshaping accounts, but also 
promises important ramifications for therapeutic interventions.  
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4.2 Epistemic Models of Mindreading  
Folk psychology purports to explain how ordinary agents coordinate their everyday lives. Most 
philosophers agree that this coordination proceeds via attributions of propositional attitudes like 
beliefs and desires (e.g., Churchland, 1994). In order to show that people understand and predict 
mental states and behaviors via attributing beliefs and desires, theorists use examples like the 
following. Seeing your colleague leave with her coffee mug, you try to predict whether she will 
get coffee upstairs or across the street. While you know that the upstairs dispenser is broken, you 
still attribute to her the desire to go upstairs and the belief that there’s coffee there. How are you 
able to discern that her perspective on the world does not contain information that appears 
immediately obvious to you?  That is, how are you able to attribute the false belief that there is 
coffee upstairs? 
The above scenario is a version of a paradigmatic task used to study mindreading - the false 
belief task (Wimmer and Perner, 1983; see Wellman et al. 2001 for a meta-analysis). In this task, 
the participant (three-year-old) observes two dolls as one of them (Sally) puts a toy in location X 
and leaves the room. While Sally is out of the room, the other doll (Anne) switches the toy from 
location X to location Z. As Sally returns, the participant is asked whether Sally will look for the 
toy in location X (when she thought she left it) or location Z (the toy’s current whereabouts). 
Until recently, theorists interested in folk psychology have focused on the mechanisms 
underlying our predictions and explanations. While theory theory (henceforth TT) explains 
propositional attitude attributions in terms of tacit theoretical reasoning, simulation theory 
(henceforth ST) appeals to tacit perspective-taking of the target. Furthermore, some argue that 
TT but not ST accords meta-representation a key role in APA. According to TT, one needs to be 
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able to represent the target’s faulty representation of the world (Perner, 1991). This 
representation is constructed with the aid of tacit general theoretical knowledge about human 
psychology (Carruthers, 1996). According to TT, children can eventually pass the false belief 
test as their conceptual repertoire grows and holds an increasing number of folk rules or 
principles connecting mental states with sensory stimuli, behavioral responses, and other mental 
states. 
In contrast, according to ST, mental state attributions involve a type of self-projection into the 
target’s shoes. By projecting herself into the target’s shoes, the simulator gets on to what it’s like 
to be in the target’s situation (e.g., Goldman, 2009). For example, in trying to discern whether 
your friend likes his baked potatoes, you project yourself in his shoes while abstracting away 
from the fact that you yourself love baked potatoes. Simulation theorists do not think that you 
need much theoretical knowledge to engage in mindreading. The simulator “rents out” her own 
mind to arrive at the attribution. There is no need to engage in theoretical reasoning about human 
psychology because the simulator happens to be such a human herself (Harris, 1992; Heal, 
1996). According to ST, children are able to pass the false belief test once they become “more 
adept at imaginatively identifying with other people and at imagining counterfactual situations” 
(Davies & Stone, 1995b, p. 6).  
Most theorists of mindreading distinguish between low-level and high-level mindreading (e.g., 
Goldman, 2009). This distinction was first introduced in the context of clarifying various types 
of simulation. In particular, while low-level simulation refers to “unmediated resonance” or 
mirroring of emotions and intentions (e.g., being hit with a pang of pain while seeing your 
partner in pain), high-level simulation refers to attribution of propositional attitudes. High-level 
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simulation (ST) entails projecting oneself into the target’s shoes and then feeding the resultant 
‘pretend’ beliefs and desires into our own decision-making process.   
Notably, theorists have now introduced a hybrid account of mindreading (e.g., Goldman, 2006; 
Botterill & Carruthers, 1999, Nichols & Stich, 2003). Hybrid accounts still allot the main role to 
their preferred method of APA while granting certain limited capacities from the opposing 
method. For example, Botterill and Carruthers argue that TT still plays the default role in APA, 
but some limited capacity for simulation might be present as well. Likewise, Goldman argues 
that simulation does the “heavy lifting” in APA, but some type of theorizing may supplement 
simulation from time to time.   
In sum, according to epistemic models of high-level mindreading, the nature of folk 
psychological practices is clear. Folks achieve social coordination by explaining and predicting 
mental states and behavior in terms of propositional attitudes like beliefs and desires. The main 
disagreement centers on the nature of cognitive mechanisms responsible for these attributions 
(Von Eckardt, 1997). 
Shifting the focus away from epistemic functions of APA, mindshaping theorists argue that we 
do not attribute propositional attitudes for prediction and explanation, but for shaping mental 
state in accordance with social norms. According to these theorists, mindshaping evolved to 
promote cooperation and cognitive homogeneity. While low-level mindshaping ensures rule 
following via mimicry, imitation, intention perception, and so on; high-level mindshaping 
ensures rule following via a bi-directional exchange of justifications (McGeer, 2015; Zawidzki, 
2013). 
4.3 Low-Level Mindshaping  
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Low-level mindshaping pervades everyday life. Methods of low-level mindshaping ensure 
cognitive homogeneity through “irresistible conformism and pedagogy” necessary for quick 
cultural transmission (Zawidzki, 2008, p. xvii). Internalizing our cultural repertoire allows us to 
understand that certain types of situations call for certain types of beliefs, emotions, and 
behavioral responses. 
Low-level mindshaping methods are “simple” in not relying on attributions of propositional 
attitudes. Instead, low-level mindshaping relies on more or less direct perception of mental 
states, character traits, behavioral patterns, and so on. In particular, some mental states like 
emotions and intentions are directly perceivable (e.g., Gallagher, 2016; Rochat, 2009). For 
example, the ability to directly experience my dance partner's intentions and emotions allows us 
fluid coordination. Gallagher summarizes the nature of this engagement in the following way: 
We often understand the actions, responses, intentions and emotions of 
others, in their embodied comportments – their postures and 
movements, facial expressions, eye direction, gestures and vocal 
intonation, as well as their speech, in contexts of our dynamic 
interactions, all of which happen in the rich pragmatic and social 
situations of everyday life (ibid, p. 453) 
 
 
Furthermore, perception of others’ mental states is supplemented by the intentional stance, i.e., 
an attitude of parsing others’ behavior into goals and appropriate ways of pursuing them 
(Zawidzki, 2013). The intentional stance allows us to internalize societal norms via enacting 
cultural scripts. For example, I need very little information to smoothly coordinate with my chess 
opponent. After all, there are only a handful of appropriate moves open at any time (McGeer, 
2015). 
While enacting cultural scripts constrains my social interactions, neither my onlookers nor I 
make use of propositional attitudes to make sense of these interactions. For example, my 
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interviewer would explain my behavior in terms of traits associated with my social role rather 
than in terms of my beliefs and desires (e.g., she is smiling because she is agreeable and 
nurturing) (Uleman, 2015; Spaulding, 2016; Bermúdez 2006a; Von Eckardt, 1997). Stereotypical 
traits are attributed via perceptions of age, gender, and social status. These low-level perceptions 
activate quick in-group/out-group categorizations and action-guiding stereotypes (Weber and 
Zou, 2012; Ames et al., 2012; Vorauer et al., 2000).16  
If everyday coordination can easily be accomplished with low-level mindshaping, what are the 
practical dividends of attributing propositional attitudes? This concern has motivated many 
theorists to question the need for APA (Bermúdez 2006a; Von Eckardt, 1997; Gallagher, 2015). 
For instance, Bermudez argues that we simply rely on heuristics and pattern detection in social 
coordination, leaving little need for propositional attitudes (Bermudez, 2006a, p.11). 
 
4.3.1 Practical Dividends of APA 
Nevertheless, McGeer and Zawidzki argue that attributing propositional attitudes indeed plays an 
important practical role in everyday life. That is, instead of aiding in prediction and explanation, 
APA facilitates bi-directional exchanges of justifications.  
This non-epistemic role is evident when we look at people’s reactions to norm violations. When 
puzzling over thoughts and behaviors out of step with social norms, we react very differently 
 
16 Furthermore, we often view norm-governed behavior as expressive of fixed biological essences. Expressing traits 
particular to societal roles is perceived to be an unintentional result of nature, a consequence of membership in that 
kind (Mallon, 2016). For example, a man raised in a Hispanic machismo culture would not be able to help but feel 
“enraged” if his masculinity were threatened in some paradigmatic way. He has internalized the appropriateness of 
these feelings by observing their paradigmatic displays in his male family members, peers, and popular culture. This 
expression of his masculinity trait is taken to be “natural” and involuntary. Hence, he is able to acquire societal 
benefits from its expression (e.g. get excused for punching his offender in the face) (e.g., Griffiths 1997). 
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from scientists puzzling over unobservables. Instead of adjusting our theory like good 
epistemologists, we proceed by demanding justifications (McGeer, 2015, p. 166). 
This non-epistemic role is further evident when we look at the causal powers of social 
expectations. In particular, attributing (even false) propositional attitudes to others is akin to 
shaping them into existence. For example, happily believing that your daughter likes practicing 
the piano eventually causes her to like practicing the piano. The child responds to encouragement 
and eventually comes to hold the relevant attitudes.17 
Zawidzki argues that abilities to exchange of justifications allowed our ancestors to reach new 
levels of cooperation (e.g., Sterelny, 2006). Zawidzki describes this evolutionary pressure in the 
following way (my emphasis):  
When it comes to normative sanctions, propositional attitude 
attribution is part of a negotiated give-and-take aimed at determining 
the normative status of an interpretive target, and hence whether or 
which sanctions are appropriate (ibid, p. 222).  
 
In particular, APA allows the receiver of a promise to question the veracity of others’ 
commitments in the face of aberrant behavior (e.g., “I know she said she is committed to this 
cause, but is that how she really feels given her recent behavior?”). Furthermore, it allows the 
maker of the promise to search through her own propositional attitudes in order to find credible 
justifications for her aberrant behavior (e.g., “I know I promised to bring two bushels of wheat 
from the outpost, but I misunderstood your request.”). As a result, APA pays practical dividends 
by allowing us to discern committed partners as well as negotiate our failings (Zawidzki, 2008; 
Sellars, 1997; Brandom, 1994; Frankish, 2004). 
 
17 Common examples of self-fulfilling prophesies include both negative and positive outcomes (Biggs, 2013).  
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4.4 The Affective Burdens of Social Selves  
Now that we have outlined the main tenets of the mindshaping account, it’s time to take a closer 
look at its shortcomings. According to the mindshaping account, APA evolved to ensure a bi-
directional exchange of justifications. In particular, given the efficacy of low-level mindshaping 
in everyday social coordination, APA serves a distinct practical role by facilitating the “give and 
take” in the “court of law”. That is, partners in cooperation attribute propositional attitudes in 
order to establish the mental reality behind explicit commitments (e.g., “I know he said he’s 
committed to contributing, but is that how he really feels?”). 
Nevertheless, there are reasons to doubt that APA evolved to ensure a bi-directional exchange of 
justifications. In particular, this account mischaracterizes the burdens of interpersonal 
coordination. Findings suggest that the primary practical burdens of interpersonal coordination 
are affective in kind (Decety, 2014; Cummins, 1999; Cheng and Tracy, 2014; Hawley, 1999). 
That is, any account of APA needs to explain how attributing propositional attitudes helps us 
navigate the affective burdens of emotion regulation and hierarchical power relations. Let’s take 
a closer look at each burden in turn.  
4.4.1 The Struggle for Emotion Regulation  
As we’ve seen in the previous section, low-level mindshaping ensures a measure of automatic 
affective resonance (Gallagher, 2016, p. 263). For example, we automatically respond to others’ 
intentions and affective states by tracking their eye movements, posture, intonations, and so on 
(ibid, p.  453). Interpersonal affective resonance emerges at a very young age. Infants respond to 
their immediate environment via mimicry and somato-sensorimotor resonance (Lodder et al., 
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2014; Rochat, 2009). For example, infants become instantly distressed as soon as another infant 
starts to cry (Dondi et al., 1999; Martin & Clark, 1987). 
To a lesser extent, this type of emotional attunement is also present in adults. Findings on mirror 
neurons support the existence of primitive mimicry or re-experiencing others’ motor intentions 
and emotions (e.g., Lacoboni et al., 2005; Kaplan & Iacoboni, 2006). Given a large cortical 
overlap between regions responsible for processing firsthand and others’ somatic and affective 
experience, we re-experience a large portion of others’ low-level states (Gallese et al. 1996; 
Rizzolatti et al. 1995; Grezes and Decety 2001; Singer et al. 2004; Keysers et al. 2004; Wicker at 
al. 2003).  
In the same vein, studies on emotion contagion detail our disposition to “catch” others’ emotions 
(Hatfield et al., 1994). For example, Hsee et al. (1990) found that participants who watched a 
videotape of a target describing sad or happy moments proceeded to experience these emotions 
themselves. Similarly, participants watching others make disgust faces proceeded to experience 
disgust themselves.  
In short, people are affectively immersed in their interactions. We automatically respond to our 
interlocutors via mimicking their facial expressions, re-experiencing their affective states, and so 
on (Lodder et al., 2014; Rochat, 2009; Lacoboni et al., 2005; Kaplan & Iacoboni, 2006; Hatfield 
et al., 1994).  
Nevertheless, there are plenty of everyday situations in which this type of emotional immersion 
would severely hinder social coordination. As many family holiday survivors know, being 
emotionally attuned to one’s family members could be disastrous for successful social 
coordination. Consider the following example of emotional attunement. As your partner 
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exclaims in distress, you immediately “catch” their general emotion and become distressed 
yourself (Elfenbein, 2014; Hatfield et al., 1994). If this automatic reaction is not inhibited, you 
will fail to respond appropriately in service of social coordination (e.g., your own distress will 
now prevent nuanced coordination) (e.g., Singer, 2006). Decety summarizes this regulatory need 
in the following way: 
If not regulated, affective resonance can be costly, both 
physiologically and cognitively, and can eventually conflict with the 
observer’s capacity to be of assistance to the other (Decety and Lamm, 
2009b). Difficulty inhibiting or reducing an emotional response may 
deplete the resources available for other aspects of self-regulation…, 
hindering the ability to function adaptively and appropriately (Decety, 
2014, p.103). 
 
In sum, philosophers interested in folk psychology have underappreciated the affective burdens 
plaguing interpersonal coordination. Hence, accounts detailing the adaptiveness of APA need to 
explain how these mechanisms allow us to overcome the affective burdens of interpersonal 
coordination.  
4.4.2 Struggles Navigating Social Hierarchies      
Mindshaping theorists argue that APA evolved to ensure cooperation via a bi-directional 
exchange of justifications. These theorists make use of the social exchange hypothesis 
(Cosmides and Tooby 1992, 1994). According to social exchange hypothesis, cognitive 
mechanisms evolved in the context of cooperation. In this context, reciprocity could only be 
rewarded if humans evolved cognitive mechanisms for cheater detection (i.e., detection of parties 
who enjoy group benefits without contributing). According to the mindshaping account, high-
level mindshaping evolved to facilitate bi-directional cheater detection (i.e., helping cooperative 
parties track justifications for aberrant behavior).  
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Nevertheless, findings reveal that our mental architecture is attuned to a hierarchical and not bi-
directional exchange of justifications. In particular, according to the social dominance 
hypothesis, our mental architecture evolved in the context of within group competition under the 
guise of cooperation (e.g., Cummins, 1999; Cheng and Tracy, 2014; Hawley, 1999). Contra the 
mindshaping account, detecting norm violations is not a concern plaguing all interpersonal 
coordination. In fact, it is a concern specific to those monopolizing access to group resources. 
Those with dominant access to group resources work to maintain the status quo by collecting 
justifications from possible norm violators, and not vice versa (e.g., Cummins, 1999; Cheng and 
Tracy, 2014; Hawley, 1999). Cummins (1999) summarizes this hypothesis in the following way:  
Violation-detection is implicated in the acquisition and maintenance of 
dominance rank. Low-ranking individuals attempt to improve their 
access to competitive resources through acts of cheating and 
deception. Dominant individuals attempt to maintain priority of access 
to resources by detecting and thwarting acts of cheating and deception 
(ibid, p. 231).  
  
In other words, collecting justifications is not a way of ensuring egalitarian cooperation but a 
way of keeping the dominant in charge. Those benefitting from the current hierarchical 
organization have a special interest in maintaining the status quo by punishing those trying to 
change their access to resources by cheating and deception.  
Converging lines of findings support the social dominance hypothesis. If our cognitive 
mechanisms evolved to facilitate a bi-directional exchange of justifications, social rank should 
make no difference to their functioning. However, it appears that social rank plays a key role in 
our ability to track norm violations and their respective justifications. 
Awareness of social rank emerges early in cognitive development. Specifically, children as 
young as 24 months organize their interactions according to implicit rules of social dominance 
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(Frankel and Arbel 1980; Hold-Cavell and Borsutzky 1986; La Freniere and Charlesworth 1983; 
Rubin and Caplan 1992). Furthermore, it appears that people retain significantly better memories 
of low-ranking norm violators than their high-ranking counterparts (e.g., Mealey et al.,1996). 
In order to further test the social dominance theory, Cummins (1999) broke up participants into 
two groups. The first group was assigned to a cheater-detection task, while the second group was 
assigned to a truth testing task. Consider the following description of the two tasks:  
In the cheater-detection version of the task, reasoners were told that 
there was an important rule in the dormitory, namely, that if someone 
is assigned to tutor a study session, that person is required to tape 
record the session. The reasoners were then shown four cards. One 
side of each card indicated whether or not the person in question had 
been assigned to tutor a particular study session and the other side 
indicated whether or not the person had in fact tape recorded the 
session. The faces of each card showed, respectively, “Assigned to 
tutor the session,” “NOT assigned to tutor the session,” “Taped the 
session,” and “Did NOT tape the session.” Reasoners were instructed 
to select the card or cards that need to be turned over to determine 
whether or not the person followed the rule. In the truth-testing version 
of the task, reasoners were told that study sessions took place in the 
dorm, but no mention was made of a rule concerning them. Instead, 
they were asked to imagine that they had overheard someone say, “If 
I’m assigned to tutor a session, I always tape record the session.” They 
were then shown same four cards described earlier and were asked to 
select the card or cards that need to be turned over to determine 
whether or not the person told the truth (ibid, p. 234). 
 
These two tasks were performed across four conditions:  
• High ranking: The reasoner adopted the perspective of a high-
ranking individual (Resident Assistant) checking on low-ranking 
individuals (Students). 
• Low ranking: The reasoner adopted the perspective of a Student 
checking on Resident Assistants. 
• Equally high ranking: The reasoner adopted the perspective of a 
Resident Assistant checking on other Resident Assistants. 
• Equally low ranking: The reasoner adopted the perspective of a 
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Experiments revealed that individuals asked to assume socially dominant roles were significantly 
more vigilant for norm violations than individuals who assumed lower-ranking roles. 
Justifications were demanded from the lower-ranked individuals and not vice versa. To isolate 
the effects of social rank, experimenters showed that this asymmetry was not maintained for 
other forms of social reasoning tasks such as truth-testing.  
Now that we have detailed two underappreciated struggles plaguing interpersonal coordination, 
it’s time to take a closer look at the mechanistic details behind theorizing and simulation. If the 
mechanistic details behind theorizing and simulation reveal their adaptiveness in navigating 
these particular struggles, we can infer the practical functions of APA.  
4.5 The Emotion-Regulatory Role of APA 
As detailed in the previous sections, automatic interpersonal resonance could hinder nuanced 
social coordination (e.g., Decety, 2014). Theorists interested in the adaptive functioning of APA 
need to explain how interpersonal coordination survives this obstacle. To meet this challenge 
head on, I propose to look back at the mechanistic details offered by the epistemic account of 
mindreading.  
Findings suggest that both ST and TT involve selective inhibition of one’s current mental states 
in service of mental state attribution (Aboulafia-Brakha et al., 2011; Singer, 2006). The 
regulatory function is revealed in imaging findings. In particular, OFC (orbitofrontal cortex) and 
vmPFC (ventromedial prefrontal cortex) responsible for attributing propositional attitudes 
function as top-down mediators of sub-cortically realized affective responses (e.g., Zelazo et al., 
2008; Diamond, 2002; Decety & Michalska, 2010; Cheng et al., 2007).  
 
 
  77 
In particular, Cheng et al. (2007) found that medical practitioners are particularly adept at 
exploiting the emotion-regulatory role of APA. Specifically, fMRI scans on medical practitioners 
viewing patients being pricked with needles revealed activation of regions responsible for 
attributing propositional attitudes (e.g., vmPFC and OFC), as well as increased connectivity 
between these regions and regions responsible for low-level empathic responses. Increased 
connectivity suggests frequent use of this regulatory network. Unusually frequent use of this 
regulatory network is to be expected given the unusual everyday demands of the medical 
profession. 
In short, given the hazardous nature of low-level mindshaping and findings outlined above, 
attributions of propositional attitudes play an important emotion-regulatory role in social 
coordination.  
4.5.1 Unique Emotion-Regulatory Benefits of Theorizing and Simulation 
Since leading theorists now accept that both simulation and theorizing play some role in APA 
(e.g., Goldman, 2006; Botterill & Carruthers, 1999, Nichols & Stich, 2003), looking at the 
emotion-regulatory functions of APA might shed light on the exact nature of this combinatorial 
account. That is, how do the regulatory benefits ensured by simulation differ from those ensured 
by theorizing? Furthermore, how do these benefits fit with what we know about the evolutionary 
context of social dominance? That is, if cognitive mechanisms of APA evolved in the context of 
social dominance, how did various methods of APA allow the dominant individuals to maintain 
preferential access to resources and the oppressed to navigate the social hierarchy?  
In this section I detail findings suggesting the following division of labor between theorizing and 
simulation. While theorizing fosters emotional distance by “reframing” affective cues from a 3rd 
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person point of view, simulation fosters interpersonal intimacy (Gross and Thompson, 2007; 
Liotti and Gilbert, 2010; Galinsky et. al., 2005). Hence, it is reasonable to hypothesize that while 
theorizing allowed the dominant to manipulate potential norm violators without succumbing to 
costly interpersonal resonance, simulation allowed the oppressed to form intimate alliances 
amongst themselves. 
Skilled manipulation requires a measure of emotion insulation. For instance, in order to deceive 
others that the status quo is in fact the best arrangement for all parties, dominant individuals 
would need to be able to downregulate emotion contagion from exploited individuals (e.g., 
Bilewicz, 2016). On the other hand, the exploited would need to be able to build social bonds 
with similar others to ensure feelings of intimacy in hopes of overcoming their circumstance 
(e.g., Galinsky et al., 2005). 
Recall that TT but not ST allots theorizing a key role in mental state attribution. Theorizing 
allows a certain type of “reframing” of low-level affective cues. This reframing allows subjects 
to change the phenomenological impact of their emotions (e.g., Gross and Thompson, 2007; 
Gross 2015; Williams et al., 2009). For example, in regulating his test anxiety, a student “steps 
back” from his emotional experience and attempts to re-interpret his anxious cues as 
“excitement about an opportunity to excel.” This psychological maneuver allows a measure of 
emotion insulation (i.e., the sense of urgency and the nature of the affective state is changed). In 
using TT, one uses knowledge of psychological principles and folk rules to re-interpret affective 
cues to a palatable form.   
In contrast, since ST requires the agent to “rent out” her own mind in arriving at the attribution, 
this type of emotional distancing is no longer available. Self-projection during simulation creates 
a greater vulnerability for emotion contagion than theorizing (Gallagher, 2012). For example, in 
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simulating the target’s distress, the manipulator might “catch” the target’s emotion and have 
trouble going through with his manipulative action. Even if the attributer “abstracts away” from 
his personal preferences in the simulation procedure, he still has to undergo the experience from 
the first-person point of view. 
If simulation is so hazardous, how does this vulnerability serve the emotion regulation needs 
created by low-level resonance? While this vulnerability could be a liability during manipulation, 
it could also be invaluable during bonding. Studies have shown that perspective taking creates 
and maintains social bonds and increases feelings of psychological closeness (e.g., Galinsky et 
al., 2005; Cialdini et al., 1997). In particular, simulating others’ mental states fosters feelings of 
intimacy and mutual understanding. In turn, these feelings provide emotion regulation benefits 
by fostering comforting feelings of belongingness and acceptance (Galinsky et al., 2005). For 
example, simulating your partner strengthens your intimate bonds and feelings of mutual 
understanding.  
Using the wrong APA mechanism would be highly disadvantageous. For example, using 
simulation and not theorizing during manipulation would impede the ability to undertake 
utilitarian actions (e.g., Majdandžić et al., 2012). Similarly, using theorizing and not simulation 
would hamper interpersonal intimacy (e.g., Koenigsberg et al., 2011). Let’s consider these 
findings in more detail.  
Majdandžić et al. (2012) investigated the effects of simulation on our abilities to undertake 
utilitarian actions. In the experimental priming condition, participants were prompted to simulate 
the target’s mental states. In the control priming condition, participants were not prompted to 
imagine themselves in the targets’ shoes. Afterward, participants were asked to make a classic 
trolley moral dilemma decision (e.g., participants were asked whether they would sacrifice the 
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previously simulated target). Previous simulation was significantly correlated with failing to 
authorize a utilitarian response to the moral dilemma using the target.  
On the other hand, using theorizing and not simulation during interpersonal bonding could 
undermine feelings of intimacy (e.g., Koenigsberg et al., 2009). In particular, Koenigsberg et 
al. (2009) had subjects attribute mental states to targets using something like folk-theory. 
Remember that according to TT, subjects sub-consciously “piece together” various clues in 
theorizing about the target’s mental state from the 3rd person point of view (e.g., Carruthers, 
2011). Likewise, in this study, subjects were explicitly asked to theorize about the targets’ 
mental states from the 3rd person point of view (Koenigsberg et al., 2009; Ochsner & Gross, 
2005; 2008). Researchers found that this strategy impeded feelings of interpersonal intimacy 
between the subjects and their targets.  
In sum, we have seen some reasons to suspect that each attribution method provides unique ways 
of processing interpersonal emotions. While ST facilitates feelings of intimacy, TT allows a level 
of emotional insulation often seen in social manipulation (Galinsky et al., 2005; Cialdini et al., 
1997). 
Are these predictions borne out? Indeed, it appears that participants with a low subjective status 
are, in fact better at simulating what it’s like to be in others’ shoes than their high-ranking 
counterparts (Kraus et al., 2010).18 In contrast, participants asked to assume high-ranking roles 
are indeed better at using TT to represent others’ faulty representations of the world and worse at 
using ST than their low-ranking counterparts (Blader et al., 2016  Fiske, 1993; Galinsky et al., 
2006; Lammers et al., 2008; Tjosvold and Sagaria, 1978; Schmid-Mast et al., 2009).  
 
18 Subjective social status (SSS) is often defined as one’s belief about one’s location in a status order” (e.g., Singh-
Manoux et al., 2005). 
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4.5.2 Self-Directed APA 
In this section I propose to expand this account to self-directed attribution of propositional 
attitudes. Looking closely at the use of these mechanisms in the modern context of social 
oppression might help us outline important therapeutic interventions.  
Getting onto our own propositional attitudes takes a bit more than being hit with a pang of 
hunger or becoming aware of an itch. While many theorists argue that we have more or 
less direct access to our sensory states, direct access to our propositional attitudes is a 
matter of some debate.19 While some theorists argue that we use different psychological 
mechanisms for self-directed and other-directed APA, respectively (e.g., Goldman, 2009), 
others propose that we use the same psychological mechanism in both self and other-
directed APA (Carruthers, 2011). In particular, Carruthers argues that we use a single sub-
personal "interpretive" or non-direct process (taking sensory information as input and 
producing attitudes as output) for all APA (i.e., attributing attitudes to all others as well as 
the self).   
I do not hope to resolve the debate on the existence of “direct” introspection here. Instead, I 
outline distinct emotion-regulative differences between ST and TT, respectively. In particular, 
while self-directed simulation fosters feelings of diachronic continuity, self-directed theorizing 
fosters a sense of self-control.  
 
19 Access is said to be “direct” if it allows us knowledge of our own mental states that is itself not based on 
knowledge of other things in the world (Schwitzgebel, 2019). Roughly, introspection is typically defined as a mental 
process that allows us direct access to our currently ongoing, or very recently past, mental states or processes. 
Notably, the existence of these self-regulative differences does not indicate the existence of direct introspective 
access. That is, simply because either simulation or theorizing could be used in self-directed attribution of 
propositional attitudes, it does not rule out the existence of a third self-directed method like direct introspection. 
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One way to figure out whether I hold the attitude that “gymnastics is important to me” is to gauge 
my reaction to various gymnastics related hypothetical scenarios. If my heart fills with horror at 
the prospect of forgetting to watch gymnastics, I can immediately sense its importance in my life. 
This simulative process is commonly referred to as mental time travel and activates the same 
neural network responsible for simulation.20 This process is perspectival, phenomenologically 
rich, and has a distinct autonoetic component or “a unique awareness of re-experiencing in the 
here and now” (Tulving, 1985; Hassabis and Maguire, 2007). That is, when I imagine forgetting 
to watch gymnastics, I experience a distinct phenomenological awareness of what it would be like 
to undergo that experience.  
Another way to figure out whether I hold a particular attitude is via self-directed theorizing. 
According to Carruthers (2011), our sub-conscious interpretive mechanism takes various pieces 
of evidence (e.g., extended collection of gymnastics memorabilia) and applies the same general 
folk-psychological theory it would apply to anyone: “anyone who acts this way must really like 
gymnastics; hence, I like gymnastics.”  
Simulative and interpretive methods of self-directed APA offer distinct emotion-regulative 
benefits and pitfalls. In the previous section we’ve seen that other directed theorizing allows 
dominant to avoid interpersonal affective resonance. In this way, these individuals could avoid 
encountering the emotional aftermath of their actions. Likewise, self-directed theorizing also 
helps subjects avoid volatile intrapersonal emotions. 
 
20 The default neural network is activated during simulation of mental states, episodic memory, and simulation of 
hypothetical scenarios (Hassabis et al., 2014; St. Jacques, et al., 2014; e.g. De Brigard, 2014; Klein, 2015; Tulving, 
1985; Hassabis and Maguire, 2007).  
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During self-directed theorizing, one tacitly applies different models or “theories” to one’s current 
mental state. In self-directed theorizing we “step-back” from the experience and interpret it from 
the 3rd person point of view (e.g., “anyone who acts this way must really like gymnastics; hence, 
I like gymnastics.”). Once we look at our experience from the 3rd person point of view, we tacitly 
shift our attention away from actually undergoing the experience. For example, a dominant 
individual might re-interpret his perception of others’ facial expressions as not responsive to his 
unjust actions but as responsive to other extraneous circumstances (Gross, 1998).  
In the same vein, Robinaugh and McNally (2010) show that adopting the observer perspective 
helps an experience become “incongruent with one’s sense of self” (ibid, p. 650). In other words, 
using self-directed theorizing would allow the dominant individual to re-interpret aversive 
interpersonal emotions as irrelevant to his sense of identity. In fact, researchers found that 
adopting the observer perspective is a mechanism of cognitive avoidance, allowing a measure of 
emotional distance (Wilson and Ross, 2003; Lemogne et al., 2009). In this way, dominant 
individuals could avoid confronting potentially uncomfortable ramifications of their actions 
during self-reflection (e.g., Dubois et al., 2015).  
In contrast, extended use of self-directed simulation in the context of social oppression could be 
maladaptive. For example, shame is an interpersonal emotion triggered by real or imagined 
disapproval of others with high social standing (Tangney, 1992; Averill, 1982; Tangney, 1992; 
Andrews et al., 2000; Bennett et al., 2005; Morrison et al. 2001). Given the volatile nature of this 
interpersonal emotion, self-directed simulation is not the best method for self-directed attitude 
attribution. Besides its rich phenomenological component, mental time travel is rigged by one’s 
current emotional state (D’Argembeau and Van der Linden, 2004). If one does engage in self-
directed simulation while experiencing shame, one will likely project oneself to 
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phenomenologically similar scenarios. For example, in experiencing shame about my obtuse 
contribution to the discussion, I inevitably project myself to similar scenes of social rejection 
(e.g., being picked last for a team, getting stood up for a date, and so on). These “affect-colored 
glasses” present one of the biggest obstacles in cognitive behavioral therapy, i.e., depressed 
patients simply cannot imagine or “see” things getting better due to their current mood (e.g., Uher 
et al., 2013). Likewise, oppressed individuals internalize negative self-conscious emotions and 
have trouble “seeing” past their current circumstances (Chung et al., 2011). 
To make matters worse, findings suggest that neural activation associated with self-direction 
simulation may directly predispose the brain towards a non-attentive state and could be 
responsible for poor performance on attention-heavy tasks (D’Argembeau et al., 2005; Greicious 
et al., 2007). 
In sum, while targets of oppression might often use simulation to form intimate bonds with 
similar others, extending this method of APA towards the self incurs additional psychological 
costs to an already vulnerable population. As a result, therapeutic interventions for individuals 
with low subjective social standing would include de-emphasizing the use of simulation in 
everyday life. Instead, practicing assuming high-ranking positions could help build up theorizing 
skills beneficial for emotional insulation and self-control.     
Are these predictions borne out? Indeed, findings suggest that practicing self-directed theorizing 
provides greater emotion regulation benefits to participants with lower socioeconomic status than 
to their high-status counterparts (e.g., Troy et al., 2017). This difference makes sense within our 
account. In particular, high-status individuals might benefit less from practicing self-directed 
theorizing due to a ceiling effect. That is, since high-ranking individuals have already benefitted 
from self-directed theorizing throughout their life span, additional practice in this method would 
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not make as much of a difference to their emotion regulation skills as it would to the skills of 
their low-status counterparts.    
4.6 Conclusion  
I started out by outlining two underappreciated obstacles in interpersonal coordination: obstacles 
in emotion regulation and obstacles navigating the social hierarchy. I then incorporated 
mechanistic details behind theorizing and simulation to explain how these obstacles are 
negotiated in everyday life. While theorizing allowed dominant individuals to manipulate norm 
violators without succumbing to interpersonal emotions, simulation allowed the oppressed to 
form intimate alliances amongst themselves. 
As a result, we have outlined two novel practical functions of APA with important ramifications 
for therapeutic interventions. While there is no denying that APA might also be used in 
prediction, explanation, and mindshaping, these results cannot be achieved without first 
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Chapter 5: The Tension Between the Agential 




The relation between reasoning and emotion in moral judgement has been at the forefront of 
empirical and philosophical debates. Challenges from dual-process theories of mind suggest that 
System 1 automatic affective reactions drive moral judgment, while System 2 reasoning merely 
offers post hoc rationalizations.21 As a result, causes and reasons for moral judgement are often 
incongruent (Doris, 2015; Greene, 2008; Haidt, 2001; Prinz, 2009). That is, while people take 
themselves to be responding to morally relevant reasons for moral castigation of the target, they 
are often driven by morally irrelevant affective reactions (Cameron et. al., 2013). If affective 
reactions can bypass moral judgement, their epistemic significance is under threat.  
Nevertheless, this argument for incongruence has faced some recent challenges (e.g., May, 2019; 
Landy and Goodwin, 2015). To start, it is not clear whether System 1 is particularly “affectively 
laden”, while System 2 “affectively neutral”. The old “passions versus reason” dichotomy 
becomes particularly troublesome if we consider that emotions are not necessarily devoid of 
cognitive elements (e.g., Railton, 2017; May, 2019; Rozin et. al., 1997). If emotions are not 
strictly System 1 responses, their ability to bypass moral judgment is not obvious (May, 2020, p. 
8).  
 
21 Fiery Cushman, Liane Young, and Joshua Greene, “Multi-System Moral Psychology,” in The Moral Psychology 
Handbook, ed. J. Doris (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 47–71, 67. 
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In this work I offer a new argument for incongruence. In particular, I argue that (i) emotions 
function to prepare us for action, and (ii) this agential role undermines their epistemic 
significance. As a result, emotions’ ability to inform moral judgment is under threat.  
The agential nature of emotions is evident in everyday life. After all, in experiencing an emotion, 
we are not simply making note of features in the world, but also feeling ourselves prepare for 
dealing with them (e.g., Prinz, 2005; Ledoux 1996; Deonna and Teroni, 2015). For instance, in 
experiencing an emotion, we experience “readiness to move away, towards or against a given 
object” (Deonna and Teroni, 2015, p.17). 
Nevertheless, while it’s easy to notice bodily preparedness like readiness to move away, 
emotional preparedness is more elusive to introspection. Specifically, converging empirical 
findings suggest that we tacitly prepare for dealing with the world by exploiting the instrumental 
role of emotions. For example, athletes tacitly drum up feelings of rage to optimize their work 
outs, artists drum up feelings of anxiety to heighten creativity, and so on (e.g., Tamir et al., 2011; 
Butler and Gross, 2009; Netzer et al., 2015; Ma et al., 2018, Leung et al., 2015). Similarly, 
people tacitly enact episodes of anger to regulate feelings of shame, and episodes of moral 
disgust to regulate feelings of anxiety (e.g., Pascual-Leone et al., 2013; Navarrete et al., 2004).  
Unfortunately, the instrumental role of emotions in everyday life undermines their epistemic 
significance in moral deliberation. In particular, while instrumental emotions are not necessarily 
System 1 responses, their instrumentality helps them to bypass moral judgement. For instance, if 
feelings of anger work to keep my anxiety at bay, they will appear especially epistemically 
secure and resistant to reappraisal (i.e., doubting their epistemic significance during moral 
deliberation will leave my anxiety running rampant) (e.g., Greenberg and Watson 2006; Paivio 
and Pascual-Leone 2010; Greenberg and Goldman 2008). In short, while people take themselves 
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to be responding to morally relevant reasons for moral castigation of the target, they are often 
driven by morally irrelevant emotion regulation needs.  
I conclude by offering a way of partially guarding against this type of incongruence. In 
particular, I propose a way to limit the emotion regulation workload of instrumental emotions by 
cultivating self-diversity. For instance, if both nationalistic pride and athletic pride serve to 
regulate anxiety in everyday life, re-examining one while leaving the other intact might prove to 
be more manageable (e.g., Renaud and McConnell, 2002; Rafaeli-Mor and Steinberg, 2002).  
5.2 Resisting The Skeptical Challenge  
Recent theories of moral evaluation present the following skeptical challenge. Sometimes causes 
and reasons for moral judgement are incongruent. That is, while we think we are making 
judgements for morally relevant reasons, we are in fact driven by morally irrelevant affective 
causes (Doris, 2015; Greene, 2008; Haidt, 2001; Prinz, 2009). In particular, dual-process 
theories of moral cognition suggest that two systems play a role in moral evaluation. While 
System 1 is unconscious, automatic, and affectively charged; System 2 is slow, conscious, and 
affectively neutral. Furthermore, System 2 cannot change concurrent automatic affective 
processes but only offers post hoc rationalizations after the judgment has already been reached.  
Disgust reactions provide classic examples of incongruence. In particular, studies suggest that 
disgust reactions greatly amplify negative moral judgments. For example, drinking a disgusting 
drink causes people to come up with harsher moral judgements (Eskine et al., 2011). Along the 
same lines, viewing a disgusting film causes amplified condemnation of purity violations 
(Horberg et al., 2009). In these cases, the causes and reasons for moral judgement are 
incongruent. While subjects take themselves to be responding to morally relevant reasons for the 
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moral castigation of the target, they are in fact driven by morally irrelevant disgust reactions 
(Cameron et. al., 2013).  
Nevertheless, some theorists have started to question these findings on empirical and theoretical 
grounds (e.g., May, 2014; Landy and Goodwin, 2015). In particular, recent meta-analyses have 
revealed that both the control and manipulation groups rate the morality of the target just about 
the same (May, 2019, p. 3). While the differences are statistically significant, they may be too 
small to ground serious concerns about incongruence in everyday life.  
Furthermore, while dual-process theories of cognition have offered some insight into the nature 
of moral evaluation, details about the role of emotion and automaticity remain highly disputed 
(e.g., Mugg, 2016). To review, the original skeptical challenge states that System 1 automatic 
affective reactions drive moral judgment, while System 2 effortful reasoning merely offers post 
hoc rationalizations.  
However, it is not clear whether System 1 is particularly “affectively laden” while System 2 
“affectively neutral”. Likewise, it is not clear whether affect is particularly “automatic” while 
reasoning “slow” and “effortful”. As a result, affect’s ability to bypass moral reasoning is not 
obvious. 
In particular, May argues that both affect and reasoning could be somewhat automatic and 
contain cognitive elements (May, 2020). He summarizes this worry in the following way:  
Like paradigm emotional processing, reasoning can be rapid and 
relatively inaccessible to consciousness. And emotions, like paradigm 
reasoning, aid both conscious and unconscious inference, as they 
provide us with relevant information (Dutton & Aron 1974; Schwarz 
& Clore 1983), often through gut feelings about which of our many 
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In other words, both emotions and cognitions could be quick and yet provide relevant 
information about the world. If emotions offer a way of seeing the world a certain way, they 
could be a source of knowledge and justified belief. While May does not offer his own theory of 
emotions, I propose to turn our attention to theorists of emotion who defend the epistemic 
significance of emotions.   
5.2.1 The Perceptual Analogy and the Epistemic Significance of Emotions  
Many theorists of emotion argue that emotions are epistemically significant representations of 
the world (e.g., Deonna 2006; de Sousa 1987; Döring 2003, 2007; Milona 2016; Pelser 2014; 
Roberts 2013; Tappolet 2000, 2016). In particular, emotions have a representational structure by 
presenting the world as being a certain way. Emotions present the world as being a certain way 
by allowing us attribute properties to objects. For example, vegetarians’ disgust reactions 
towards meat consumption attribute disgust-worthy properties, (e.g., systematized animal 
torture), towards the practice of meat consumption. Since the content of the emotion has an 
object-property structure, it could easily be checked for veridicality (i.e., is the world really the 
way it is being presented by a given emotion?) If the practice of meat consumption really 
instantiates the relevant evaluative properties, the vegetarians’ disgust reactions could be 
described as fitting. In turn, these features could be cited as justifications for the particular 
emotion at hand. If emotions are a source of knowledge and justified belief, they are indeed 
epistemically significant representations of the world.    
In order to promote this epistemological agenda, many naturalistically inclined philosophers 
adopt the ‘Perceptual Analogy’ (e.g., Deonna 2006; de Sousa 1987; Döring 2003, 2007; Milona 
2016; Pelser 2014; Roberts 2013; Tappolet 2000, 2016). Since perceiving is a non-conceptually 
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demanding way of representing the word (e.g., one can perceptually represent the ball as round 
without having the concept of roundness), theorists inclined to grant emotions to conceptually 
unsophisticated creatures argue that emotions are similar to perceptual experiences of evaluative 
properties. Much like perceptions, emotions have a vivid phenomenology, appear to be about the 
world, and at times remain impenetrable to judgement. That is, like perceptions, emotions have 
distinct phenomenal properties that concern what it is like to experience them. Furthermore, like 
perceptions, emotions have exteroceptive intentionality or appear to be directed outward toward 
particular objects in the world (e.g., Mitchell, 2020). Finally, some perceptual illusions appear to 
be just as recalcitrant as emotional ones. For example, one can’t help but remain frightened of 
the harmless spider much in the same way one can’t simply “unsee” the Muller-Lyer illusion 
(e.g., Tappolet, 2016). Simply judging the spider to be harmless and the two lines to be identical 
does not really change the relevant feelings. 
In sum, proponents of the perceptual analogy argue that since perceptions are epistemically 
significant representations of the world, and emotions are similar to perceptions, emotions are 
also epistemically significant representations of the world.  
5.3 The Agential Component of Emotions   
Nevertheless, some theorists argue that likening emotions to perceptions fails to account for the 
distinctive agential phenomenology of emotional experiences (Deonna and Teroni, 2015; 
Kriegel, 2017; Naar, 2020). In particular, emotional episodes feature feelings of preparedness or 
unpreparedness for dealing with the world. After all, in experiencing an emotion, you are not 
simply making note of evaluative features through perception or judgement, but also feeling 
yourself prepare for dealing with them. 
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Theorists often characterize these agential components in bodily terms. For instance, 
Deonna and Teroni argue that emotions are experienced with the following feelings of agency:   
…felt readiness to move away, towards or against a given object, to 
contemplate it, to submit to it, to be attracted by it, to disengage from 
it or even to suspend any kind of interaction with it (Deonna and 
Teroni, 2015, p.17).  
 
In contrast, perceptual representations are not necessarily agential in nature. For example, I could 
perceive a slight without getting angry. In fact, anyone who has ever worked a minimum wage job 
could attest to perceiving multiple slights a day without getting enraged. Likewise, it is reasonable 
to assume to that people could perceive dangers without feeling afraid. For instance, it is likely that 
experienced fire fighters notice danger lurking at every corner without losing their cool (Kriegel, 
2017).  
Could emotion theorists maintain the epistemological agenda inspired by the Perceptual Analogy 
while finding a place for agential phenomenology? After all, while perceptions work to put us in 
touch with the world, actions carry no accompanying epistemological significance. Naar 
summarizes this worry in the following way:  
Given that it is arguably not in the nature of action in general to put us 
in touch with aspects of the world, i.e. actions in general are not 
epistemically special (at least the way perception is), the claim that 
emotions play some special kind of epistemological role becomes 
something we have no particular reason to hold (Naar, 2020, p. 4-5). 
 
In trying to account for the agential nature of emotions while retaining the epistemological agenda, 
motivational attitudinal theories of emotion argue that emotions are not simply perceptions of 
evaluative properties, but ways or modes of relating to these properties. Specifically, “emotions are 
bodily experiences of being disposed or tending to act in a differentiated way vis-à-vis a given 
object or event” (Deonna and Teroni, 2015, p.16).  
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Just like we can have different attitudes towards the same content, Deonna and Teroni argue that we 
could have different emotions towards the same content. For example, just like you can doubt that 
it’s raining and I can be sure of it; you can feel mirth at the funny joke, while I can recognize its 
merit without feeling mirth after hearing it one too many times.     
Notably, despite acknowledging the agential nature of emotions, Deonna and Teroni still uphold 
some key tenets of the epistemological agenda. While emotions do prepare us for the world, they 
only do so in virtue of correctly representing it. Just like the proponents of the Perceptual Analogy, 
Deonna and Teroni argue that affective attitudes are object directed and serve to provide important 
information about the world. In particular, emotions are “evaluative attitudes towards intentional 
contents provided by other mental states—their cognitive bases, such as judgements, imaginations, 
and perceptions” (Mitchell, 2020, p.1). For example, fear triggers bodily readiness to move away 
from an object that is represented as dangerous by perception or judgment.  
5.3.1 How Do Emotions Prepare Us for Dealing with the World?   
According to the attitudinal motivational theory, emotions prepare us for dealing with the world in a 
bodily way. However, since bodily readiness only happens in virtue of correct representation, we 
can try to account for the agential component of emotions without compromising the 
epistemological agenda.   
In this section I argue that emotions’ agential component extends beyond preparing the body for 
action. Oftentimes, emotions prepare us for dealing with the world by activating other emotions 
with instrumental value. In turn, this type of preparedness indeed compromises the epistemological 
agenda. While instrumental emotions might not necessarily be System 1 responses, their 
instrumentality allows them to bypass moral judgement.  
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While bodily preparedness is available to introspection, real world emotional experiences invite 
further types of preparation not readily available to introspection. In particular, it is often the case 
that emotions prepare us for dealing with the world by activating other emotions. Many researchers 
believes that this interplay compromises the very distinction between emotion generation and 
emotion regulation (e.g., Frijda, 2007; Mesquita, 2003; Crone, 2009; Baker et al., 2004). Mesquite 
and Frida argue that “emotional events in real life involve multiple emotions that regulate each 
other (Mesquite and Frida, 2011, p. 783). 
Converging empirical findings suggest that we tacitly prepare for dealing with the world by 
exploiting the instrumental role of emotions. For example, athletes habitually drum up feelings of 
rage to optimize their work outs, artists drum up feelings of anxiety to heighten creativity, and so on 
(e.g., Tamir et al., 2011; Butler and Gross, 2009; Netzer et al., 2015; Ma et al., 2018, Leung et al., 
2015). 
In order to flesh out the nature of instrumental emotions, Tamir et al., (2014) propose the 
expectancy-value model of emotion regulation. According to this model, people prefer to enact 
emotions they expect to be useful to them. For example, people are motivated to increase feelings 
of anger in situations they expect anger to be useful, “even in the context that bears little relevance 
to anger-related appraisals or goals” (Tamir et al., 2014, p.1).  
The authors tested people’s preference for inducing emotions they believed to be useful in 
particular circumstances, even if they previously believed these circumstances to not merit the 
relevant emotions. They found that participants preferred to read anxiety-inducing material if they 
believed anxiety would be useful to them, even if they previously indicated that the circumstances 
did not merit anxiety. Likewise, participants preferred to read anger-inducing material if they 
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believed that anger would be useful to them, even if they previously indicated that the 
circumstances do not merit anger.  
The authors theorize that people often enact instrumental emotions without explicit awareness of 
doing so. Tamir et al. summarize their findings in the following way:  
Our findings demonstrate that the expected usefulness of emotions can 
be manipulated relatively easily, even when they contradict previous 
evaluative beliefs… Indeed, such expectancies may not require 
conscious awareness. The proposed model, therefore, can potentially 
inform the understanding of both adaptive and maladaptive emotion 
regulation. To the extent that people expect anxiety or anger to be 
useful in particular contexts, they might find themselves trying to 
increase or sustain such feelings, without necessarily knowing why 
(Tamir et al., 2014, p. 13, my emphasis). 
  
If people are unaware of enacting instrumental emotions as means to an end, they would have 
little basis for distinguishing “genuine” from instrumental emotions in everyday life. After all, 
once enacted, both genuine and instrumental have a vivid phenomenology and appear to be about 
the world.   
Pascual-Leone et al., (2012) offer a detailed model of our tacit use of instrumental emotions in 
emotions regulation. The authors argue that emotions are often elicited to regulate other less 
palatable emotions. This pattern of regulation becomes habitual through negative and positive 
reinforcement. For example, feelings of anger regulate feelings of shame by displacing painful 
experiences (negative reinforcement), as well as by increasing positive feelings of preparedness or 
control (positive reinforcement). While feelings of anger feel like genuine emotions, they are often 
brought about to regulate uncomfortable emotions like shame.  
The instrumental role of emotions in emotion regulation is nicely demonstrated in the following 
study. Prior to asking participants to report their feelings about ingroup rule violations, Navarrete et 
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al. primed one group of participants with vignettes of being burglarized, and another with neutral 
content (Navarrete et al., 2004). Those primed with contemplating threatening events like being 
burglarized experienced heightened feelings of pride towards ingroup rules and derogation towards 
perceived violators of these rules. 
These results fit the model outlined above. It appears that feelings of outgroup derogation play a 
regulating role to less palatable feelings of fear and anxiety. Feelings of outgroup derogation 
displace painful feelings of anxiety (negative reinforcement) and increase positive feelings of 
preparedness or control (positive reinforcement).  
There are reasons to suspect that the instrumental role of emotions in everyday life thwarts the 
epistemological agenda and the perceptual analogy. After all, unlike perceptions, emotions are not 
triggered in response to evaluative properties, but in response to the emotion regulation needs of the 
subject. Going back to the example above, it appears that outgroup anger is not triggered in 
response to the evaluative properties of slights, but in response to the emotion regulation needs of 
the subject.  
Nevertheless, a proponent of the perceptual analogy might respond by alluding to the response-
dependent nature of evaluative properties. Specifically, there may be something in the individual 
values of the subject who regularly responds to feelings of vulnerability with anger. After all, a 
person who responses with outgroup disgust after being primed with feelings of vulnerability might 
interpret his phenomenology of vulnerability in terms of bigoted values (e.g., “This used to be a 
safe country, but now that its borders are open, it’s gone to the dogs.”). So, while his anger might 
seem to be unfitting from an objective point of view, it might in fact be an appropriate response in 
light of his own values. 
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Unfortunately, this objection does not save the epistemological agenda. While the epistemological 
agenda may tolerate value-depended emotional responses, it still requires the ability to form beliefs 
that could be questioned for justification. In other words, to avoid the threat of incongruence, the 
subject enacting emotions of outgroup derogation should be able to interrogate his emotional 
responses for moral relevance. However, if he is unable to distinguish between emotions enacted 
for instrumental ends and “genuine” emotions, he cannot interrogate them for moral relevance.  
In the next section, I propose to take a closer look at why instrumental emotions thwart our ability 
to interrogate them for moral relevance.  
5.4 The Price of Instrumental Emotions  
So far, we have seen that the agential component of emotions extends well beyond bodily 
preparedness. Converging empirical findings suggest that we often tacitly prepare for dealing 
with the world by enacting instrumental emotions.  
In this section I argue that this agential component undermines emotions’ epistemic significance 
in moral deliberation. In particular, while instrumental emotions might not necessarily be System 
1 responses, their instrumentality allows them to bypass moral judgement. Specifically, 
instrumental emotions appear to be both (i) epistemically secure, and (ii) resistant to reappraisal. 
Hence, if one has no reason to suspect that his emotions might be misleading and, upon closer 
inspection, further maintains that they are not misleading, the epistemological agenda is under 
threat.  
Why do instrumental emotions seem secure and resistant to reappraisal? Once emotions assume 
instrumental roles in regulating other emotions, we start to rely on them for regular relief. Some 
psychologists refer to this process of reliance as potentially addictive (e.g., Korman 2005; 
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Linehan 1993; Tangney et al. 1992). For example, if my feelings of anger work to keep my 
anxiety at bay, re-examining them will leave my anxiety running rampant (Pascual-Leone et al., 
2012).  
Difficulties in reappraising instrumental emotions are compounded by the fact that emotion 
regulation strategies solidify into unconscious habits. Pascual-Leone et al., (2012) summarize 
this model in the following way:  
A surge of secondary emotion dispels vulnerability and seemingly 
empowers the individual. Because of the reduction in distress (a 
negative reinforcer) and the experience of power (a positive reinforcer) 
the strategy of experiencing and expressing anger can become a 
conditioned response cued by experiences of shame (Korman, 2005). 
 
In turn, processes of reinforcement are associated with feelings of inappropriate epistemic 
certainty. Specifically, reward expectancy usually leads to over-generalization or the process of 
classifying distinct categories of situations as categorically similar (Redish et. al., 2007). For 
example, reward associated with gambling causes gamblers to feel especially epistemically 
secure in misclassifying “winning” situations as categorically distinct from “losing” situations, 
even though both situations are instances of “gambling” situations. Similarly reward expectancy 
from using instrumental emotions would cause us to misclassify all properties of the situation as 
relevant to the category of “anger-worthy” evaluative properties, even in the presence of both 
“anger-worthy” and “non-anger worthy” evaluative properties.  
While instrumental emotions appear to be epistemically secure, they are also resistant to 
reappraisal. In particular, using instrumental emotions for emotion regulation compromises our 
cognitive flexibility (i.e., the ability to re-examine and inhibit impulsive thoughts and behavior) 
(e.g., Kashdan and Rottenberg, 2010). Arguably, cognitive flexibility allows us to interrogate 
evaluative properties for moral relevance.  
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Specifically, the use of instrumental emotions for emotion regulation qualifies as a response 
focused strategy of emotion regulation. Response focused strategies are built around the desire to 
avoid the phenomenological impact of a given emotion. Focusing on avoiding the experience of 
anxiety altogether by enacting another emotion is a type of response suppression. Response 
suppression strategies are in turn associated with a lack of cognitive flexibility (Kashdan and 
Rottenberg, 2010; Hollenstein et al. 2013; Bonanno and Burton, 2014). In particular, Szczygieł 
and Maruszewski (2015) found that expressive suppression compromises performance on 
cognitively demanding tasks. In other words, avoiding certain emotions by tacitly enacting 
instrumental emotions compromises cognitive flexibility and the ability to interrogate emotional 
responses for moral relevance.  
5.5 Cultivating Self-Complexity and Cognitive Flexibility  
Now that we have outlined the epistemic threats posed by instrumental emotions, I conclude by 
offering a way of partially guarding against these threats. One reason why instrumental emotions 
are resistant to reappraisal is their emotion regulating workload. For example, if anger regulates 
anxiety, doubting anger’s epistemic significance during moral deliberation leaves my anxiety 
running rampant (e.g., Greenberg and Watson 2006; Paivio and Pascual-Leone 2010; Greenberg 
and Goldman 2008). In this section I propose a way to increase cognitive flexibility by limiting 
the emotion regulation workload of instrumental emotions.  
Proponents of the expectancy value model of emotions theorize that patterns of instrumental 
emotions solidify into unconscious habits, which in turn solidify into instrumental values 
(Korman, 2005). Instrumental values provide easily accessible societal scripts for enacting 
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instrumental emotions.22 For example, if instrumental outgroup anger has served a reliable 
emotion regulating role in Jim’s mental economy, the modern world provides a variety of readily 
accessible societal scripts that secure a regular flow of outgroup anger (Griffiths and Scarantino, 
2005, p. 6). 
How can we learn to limit the emotion regulation workload of a given set of instrumental 
emotions associated with particular values? The answer may be found in cultivating a diverse set 
of values. Social psychologists define self-diversity in terms of cognitive differentiation between 
one’s values or self-concepts. One’s self-conceptions are said to be more differentiated if they 
are less cognitively associated with one another. For example, my self-conception as a “good 
educator” is more cognitively associated with my self-conception as a “mentor” than with my 
self-perception as an “artist” (Linville, 1985; Renaud and McConnell, 2002; Niedenthal et 
al.,1992). Likewise, while my friend’s self-conception as a “good mother” is greatly cognitively 
associated to her self-perception as a “good wife”, this might not be the case for other women. 
Renaud and McConnell characterize the notion of differentiation in the following way: 
Differences in self-complexity are based on both the number of self-
aspects and the degree of redundancy among the traits describing those 
self-aspects. Greater self-complexity is revealed by a greater number 
of self-aspects that are described by traits that are less redundant with, 
and thus are more independent of, one another. Lower self-complexity, 
on the other hand, is revealed by fewer self-aspects that are described 
by more redundant traits and thus are more interrelated with one 
another… this conceptualization of self-concept organization is 
concerned with the relative amount of association among the traits 
describing aspects of one’s self (Renaud and McConnell, 2002, p. 80).  
 
 
22 Societal scripts are publicly accessible recipes for thinking, feeling, and behaving (e.g., Mesquita and Frijda 1992; 
Averill 1990).  
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How does cultivating self-diversity limit the emotion regulation workload of a given set of 
instrumental emotions? If my self-conception as a great athlete is under threat, my self-
conception as an artist remains intact enough to offer temporary emotion regulation benefits 
(Renaud and McConnell, 2002). Social psychologists have shown that people with greatly 
differentiated self-perceptions have better cognitive flexibility than those with less differentiated 
self-perceptions (for reviews see Rafaeli-Mor and Steinberg, 2002; Showers and Zeigler-Hill, 
2012). Researchers theorize that having greatly differentiated self-conceptions helps prevent 
“emotional spillover” during stressful events particular to one self-conception.  
We can apply this model toward cultivating cognitive flexibility during moral deliberation. If 
outgroup anger regulates anxiety, doubting anger’s epistemic significance during moral 
deliberation leaves my anxiety running rampant (e.g., Greenberg and Watson 2006; Paivio and 
Pascual-Leone 2010; Greenberg and Goldman 2008). However, if another, unconnected, set of 
instrumental emotions also work to regulate anxiety, doubting anger’s epistemic significance 
during moral deliberation might prove to be more manageable.   
For example, say a high-school athlete raised in the 1950’s suburbia is asked in interrogate his 
outgroup disgust for moral relevance (e.g., someone asked him to reconsider the moral relevance 
of his disgust towards same sex marriage). Could he “step back” and re-examine his affective 
reactions toward same-sex marriage? After all, his emotional reactions could fail to be fitting. 
Unfortunately, if he simply tried to set his initial affective reactions aside, he would become 
vulnerable to emotions his instrumental emotions function to regulate. However, if his values 
portfolio contains other values unrelated to his masculine athleticism, he could temporarily use 
instrumental emotions related to the to the other set of values for emotions regulation. In this 
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way, he could prevent the “emotional spillover” from being threatened in one set of instrumental 
values and find relief in another set of instrumental values. 
In sum, while forming instrumental values might be inevitable, perhaps there is a way to limit 
their toll on cognitive flexibility in everyday life.   
5.6 Conclusion   
In this work I have offered a new argument for incongruence. I have sketched a novel way in 
which emotions prepare us for dealing with the world and its toll on their epistemic significance. 
I have outlined converging empirical findings suggesting that emotions tacitly prepare for 
dealing with the world by activating other instrumental emotions. Unfortunately, while 
instrumental emotions provide emotional relief, they also invite a false sense of epistemic 
security. As a result, while people take themselves to be responding to morally relevant reasons 
for moral castigation of the target, they are often driven by morally irrelevant emotion regulation 
needs. I concluded by offering a way of partially guarding against this type of incongruence. In 
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i Bayne (2010) and others write that “the split-brain procedure has surprisingly little impact on cognitive function in 
everyday life. Split-brain patients can drive, hold down jobs, and carry out routine day to day tasks. Early 
researchers remarked on their “social ordinariness,” and were baffled by their inability to detect any cognitive 
impairments arising from the operation. 
Dahlia W. Zaidel, “AView of the World from a Split-Brain Perspective,” in E.M.R. Critchley, ed., The Neurological 
Boundaries of Reality (Northvale, NJ: Aronson, 1995), pp. 161–74; S.M. Fergusen et al., “Neuropsychiatric 
Observation on Behavioral Consequences of Corpus Callosum Section for Seizure Control,” in A.G. Reeves, ed., 
Epilepsy and the Corpus Callosum (New York: Plenum, 1985), pp. 501–14. But see also Victor Mark, “Conflicting 
Communicative Behavior in a Split-Brain Patient: Support for Dual Consciousness,” in S.R. Hameroff et al., eds., 
Towards a Science of Consciousness (Cambridge: MIT, 1996), pp. 189–96. 
ii Sperry, Vogel, and Bogen (1967) The Syndorme of hemisphere deconnection. Dahlia W. Zaidel, “AView of the 
World from a Split-Brain Perspective,” in E.M.R. Critchley, ed., The Neurological Boundaries of Reality 
(Northvale, NJ: Aronson, 1995). 
iii Schechter (2018)  
iv Left hemisphere is in control of speech, whereas the right hemisphere controls the left hand. Carlson, (2004). 
Physiology of Behavior, 6th Ed. The received view has been that visual information projected to the right visual 
field cannot be verbally reported, and visual information projected to the LVF is unavailable for behavior involving 
the right hand (Bayne, 2010). However, recent findings by Pinto et. al., (2017) show that split-brain patients can 
indeed respond accurately to stimuli appearing anywhere in the visual field using any response modality (e.g. using 
speech, right, and left hand). I save the discussion of these results for later in the paper.    
v I use the terms “subjective perspective” and “point of view” interchangeably.  
vi At the very low level, the limits of an action event are delineated by affect (Muhle-Karbe and Krebs, 2012). 
According to the theory of event coding (Hommel et al., 2001), various perceptual elements are part of the same 
event if they are represented in the same event code. This theory explains interactions between products of 
perceptual processes and the first steps of action planning (Eder and Klauer, 2007). Theory of event coding states 
that perceived features of objects and planned features of motor actions are cognitively represented through 
structurally identical “event codes”. Because of this common code, stimulus and action features can prime one 
another (Becker’s et. al., 2002; Elsner and Hommel, 2001). The main outcome of this binding is action-effect 
blindness. That is, codes that are already in use cannot be accessed for further use. The common code assumption or 
the fact that coding of percepts and actions relies on identical format of representations is supported by findings on 
selective impairments. Using the same model of code overlap, researchers proposed the affective coding hypothesis 
to demonstrate how event files are organized by affect. Specifically, affectively charged action plans (e.g. saying 
‘‘good’’ or ‘‘bad’’) impair simultaneous evaluations of stimuli with the same valence (Eder and Klauer, 2007) 
Furthermore, the single feature valence code irrevocably activates the entire event file (Hommel & Musseler, 2006; 
Musseler & Hommel, 1997a, 1997b)”. Similarly, Eder et al. (2012) demonstrated that preparing a button press that 
signals the affective value of a picture delayed the performance of an affectively congruent approach and avoidance 
movement simply because that concurrent processes was utilizing the same affective code. 
vii Since some emotional states are cognitively penetrable, this seems like a reasonable hypothesis. Karl Lange and 
William James have theorized that bodily changes associated with emotional episodes precede the feeling of 
emotion itself. They explain examples of emotional episodes such as fear by pointing to the bodily accompaniments 
of such episodes (e.g. sweaty palms, increased heart rate, dry mouth). They hypothesized that emotions simply are 
neocortical “readouts” of bodily autonomic arousals (Cannon, 1927) 
viii Here I replace “percepts” used in the original quote with “emotions”.  
ix In particular, while Bayne and Chalmers argue that enjoying a unified phenomenal perspective entails 
experiencing all phenomenal states as merely co-conscious, I argue that enjoying a unified phenomenal perspective 
entails experiencing aspects of your phenomenal field in orders of perceived importance and perceived 
changeability. Since affective states allow us to experience aspects of our phenomenal field via orders of perceived 
importance and orders of perceived changeability, affective phenomenology is not just another phenomenal state in 
the unstructured phenomenal field. Since affect plays a special role in ensuring a unified subjective perspective, 
unified affect in the split-brain is enough to ensure a unified subjective perspective on the world. 
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x Transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) is a type of targeted brain stimulation induced by a changing magnetic 
field (e.g. Killgore and Yurgelun-Todd, 2004) 
